

EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE INITIATIVE:
A CROSSROAD FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

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ABSTRACT

EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE INITIATIVE: A CROSSROAD FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, by Colonel Nachum Zaken, ISRAEL, 159 pages.

This thesis attempts to examine certain reasons for the conflict in the Middle East between the Arab States and Israel by taking several steps back and looking at recent wars and their causes, by studying the conflicts closely, by looking at the Palestinian and the other internal and external factors which impact on the Arab-Israeli dispute.

From the first days of Israel's existence this area has been in turmoil. In terms of time, equipment, weapons and forces, each war has been worse than the previous. There was no state which wouldn't pay the price of the military struggle yet many have not come to the conclusion that a settlement for the crisis must be founded in negotiation and tolerance through understanding and a willingness for compromise, and not by armed aggression and escalation, violence and wars. It almost seems out of a human beings' capability to find a formula which can overcome the obstacles being laid on the way to peace.

The 1973 War was Arab initiated to force the world to alter the "status quo" of the area and also an attempt to regain as much area as possible from the land of Palestine.

This research is focused on recent historical experience, on the present capabilities of Middle East nations to conduct war, and on motives which foster disruption and fighting.

It is a known fact that the Middle East region is very complex due to the many different interests in this area, both internal and external. It is almost impossible to go into all these components and examine each of them individually. Therefore, this thesis concentrates on a few major factors--from the viewpoint of the author.

It has to be indicated that this study does not address the immediate possibility of nuclear war in this area in spite of the effort of some states in the Middle East to acquire a nuclear capability.

The analysis of recent historical background and present political and military situations reveals that most of the factors which created the initial dispute are still existent and under stress; therefore, the author regretfully concludes that another war is almost certainly unavoidable.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A. Statement of the Problem.

Peace between Egypt and Israel has come as a result of many factors--both old and new, not just as a result of the October 1973 War or Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's dramatic visit to Israel. The October War was no doubt a very important factor which caused changes in the minds of a few Arab-State leaders about the State of Israel. Not all of them talk about destroying Israel any more, and a few of them are ready to negotiate under certain conditions; i.e., Jordan, but there are many who still think only about using war as a means to solve the conflict that has plagued the area since the formation of the State of Israel. Yet, other factors which influenced the course of the present peace between Egypt and Israel must also be analyzed. For example:

- 1) The reasons for the Arab-Israeli conflict.
- 2) The right of the Jewish people to the land of Israel compared to Palestinian rights.
- 3) External and internal factors in the Middle East which precipitated or delayed the course of peace.
- 4) The security borders and Sinai as a fighting area.

5) Actions which advanced the peace treaty, the efforts of the United States, and the peace treaty itself.

The above points lead to the question this thesis attempts to answer. Will the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel bring the other Arab States into the peace circle or is another war between Israel and the Arab States unavoidable? The description of Israel which follows provides a better understanding of the importance of the conflict.

B. Israel

Israel is located at the extreme eastern end of the Mediterranean. It is bounded on the north by Lebanon, on the east by Syria and Jordan, and on the south by Egypt. (See maps 1-1, 1-2.) This location has made the land of Israel a target of imperial conquests throughout history: Ancient Egyptians (16th Century B.C.), Babylonians (586 B.C.), Greeks (333 B.C.), Romans (63 B.C.), Byzantines (395 A.D.), Arabs (1072 A.D.), Crusaders (1099 A.D.), Ottomans (1517 A.D.), and British (1918 A.D.).

Events like the destruction of the first and second temples (586 B.C., and 70 A.D.), the "Masada Conflict" (73 A.D.), and "The Holocaust" (1939-1945) aid in understanding the meaning of Israel for the Jewish people and their promise: "Never Again."

Israel's population is 3.5 million people (more than 500,000 are Arabs) and the Israeli people are of all

racess. They speak many different languages, Hebrew and Arabic being the official languages.

The area can be divided into several regions each with its own characteristics. From north to south:

1) The Golan Heights in the eastern part of the Jordan Valley is mostly a volcanic area which has particular strategic importance. Mount Hermon which is 2,814 meters is the highest point in Israel. (See map 1-3, figure 1-1.)

2) Galilee is a mountainous region with no large cities. Most of the population lives in Kibbutz⁴ and in villages. Galilee is the only part of Israel that has a major water resource.

3) The coastal plain stretches along the Mediterranean. This area is fertile and has a large population in urban centers.

4) The Jordan Valley runs all the way through the lake of Galilee and meanders to the Dead Sea. The sources of the Jordan River are in the north from the foothills of Mount Hermon.

5) Judea and Samaria are known as the West Bank. Most of this area is mountainous and desert. The majority of people on the West Bank are Arabs. They live in villages and towns (Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, the eastern part of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Hebron).

6) Jerusalem, which sits in the heart of Israel and on the crest of the Judaeen Mountain, is the capital of Israel. It is a symbol of Israeli sovereignty and is one of the most important reasons for the conflict. The Jewish people say, "If I forget thee, O' Jerusalem, let my right hand wither."⁵ The Palestinians, on the other hand, charge that Jerusalem is theirs and only theirs; however, Jerusalem is also very special for many from all over the world. From every corner people flock to Jerusalem--some for its beauty, some for its holiness, and some for its history. Regardless of the reason, Jerusalem is a very important and exceptional city which only the human heart can feel.

7) The Dead Sea, nearly 1,300 feet below sea level, is the world's lowest point. Its salt content is ten times that of sea water. The Dead Sea and also the Jordan River are the eastern border between Israel and Jordan.

8) The Negev and Arava Valley are the driest parts of Israel. At their southern point, the Gulf of Eilat,⁶ are the port and city of Eilat, whose shores go south as far as Sharm-El-Sheikh, which controls the entrance to the Gulf of Eilat.

After World War I, on Nov 2, 1917, the Balfour Declaration was issued supporting "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people".⁷ Herbert Samuel, a member of the Asquith Cabinet, supported

the idea that Great Britain and the Jews had a common interest in detaching Palestine from the Turkish Empire. Later, on July 22, 1922, the League of Nations confirmed the "Palestine Mandate, citing the Balfour Declaration in the preamble and recognizing the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine, and . . . the grounds for reconstituting their National Home in that country."⁸ On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations confirmed the right of the Jewish people to a state of their own in their ancient homeland which would be divided into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. The Jewish people accepted this resolution, but Arab nations rejected it.

This was the beginning of the Arab-Israeli dispute which is one between two peoples, each claiming the right to the same territory and the entire area by virtue of historical right. Both the Israelis and the Arabs encountered a refugee problem following the wars (Israel particularly after the 48 War). The two populations the wars displaced were almost equal in size. While the Jewish people cared for their refugees and established them as useful citizens of the State of Israel whereby they became productive human beings . . . beings who were driven out of many countries including Arab countries where they had lived for hundreds of years. The Arab refugees are still kept as political pawns in camps the United Nations finances. Neither the Jewish nor the

Arab refugee problem differs from many other refugee problems in world history, such as, the Greek-Turkish conflict following World War I, West Germany after World War II, and after the Indian-Pakistan conflict of the early 1960s --tens of millions of human beings were involved in these cases which were solved without returning the refugees each to his own home.

C. Arab States and the Palestinians.

The Palestinian people and the Arab States made clear that "Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinian Arab people and an integral part of the great Arab homeland."⁹ This approach identifies the Palestinians as Arab citizens who were living in Palestine until 1947 and whoever was born to them before or after that time either within or outside Palestine.

On the other hand, only "Jews who lived permanently in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist movement are considered Palestinians."¹⁰ This definition could not be accepted by Jews who gathered in Palestine from exile all over the world, particularly from Europe after World War II, and from Arab States.

The result of these two contrary approaches has been a long armed struggle. The Arab decision was that "armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine and is therefore a strategy and not tactics."¹¹

Also, from the viewpoint of the Palestinian,

The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate Document and what has been based upon them are considered null and void. The claim of a historical or spiritual tie between Jews and Palestine does not tally with historical realities nor with the constituents of statehood in their true sense The Jews are not one people with an independent personality. Rather, they are citizens of the states to which they belong Zionism is a political movement organically related to world imperialism and hostile to all movements of liberation and progress in the world Israel is a constant threat to peace in the Middle East and the entire world.¹²

It is easy to understand that a bitter conflict exists between two sides each charging that the land of Palestine belongs only to it. This position has brought the sides to military, diplomatic, economic, and propaganda war since the Jewish State was re-established in 1948.

The Jewish people, on the other hand, emphasize their right to the land through historic ties to the land since the time of Abraham. The Israeli people of these days are the same people with the same religion, culture and language as those of 2,000 years ago. The connection between Jewish people and Palestine is described by David Ben-Gurion who was the first Israeli Prime Minister.

"Jews tried to settle on the land in many other countries. It was tried in Russia--Argentina--United States of America. It failed. It succeeded here. There was no love for land there; there was love of the land here (in Israel)."¹³

Because of the positions of both sides, it seems that today one may solve many problems and not solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. As mentioned previously, at the core of the conflict lies the Arab refusal to recognize the right of the Jewish nation to self-determination and national sovereignty in at least a part of Palestine. To believe peace in the Middle East will come before the Arabs recognize Israel's right to exist--with emphasis on right--is not realistic. Yet, destroying Israel, as the Arabs desire, would require too high a price in human life and material as has been proven by previous conflicts in the region.

The Egyptian leader President Mohamed Anwar-El-Sadat has come to recognize the insurmountable difficulties encountered by the Arabs in past attempts to destroy Israel and has given his hand in friendship to Israel despite the fact that Egypt, militarily the strongest Arab State, is the only one that has taken part in every conflict against Israel. This explains the importance of Egypt's being the first Arab State to turn from the ways of war to the way of negotiation in a search for peace.

D. Sinai Peninsula.

The Sinai Peninsula is the stage on which so many wars between Egypt and Israel occurred. Since 1948, five wars were fought there--the War of Independence (1948-49), the Sinai Campaign (1956), the Six-Day War (1967), the War of Attrition (1969-70) and, recently, the 1973 Yom Kippur War. What is the Sinai Peninsula? It is a desert region that is approximately 220 kilometers in width and 370 kilometers in length. (See map 1-4.) Most of it is uninhabited with a population of around 60,000 people. Most of them live in the north in and around the city of El-Arish. Some others who are nomadic Bedouin live in the southern part of the Peninsula.

The Sinai Peninsula is bordered by the Mediterranean Sea in the north, by the 1949 Armistice line along the Gulf of Eilat to Sharm-El-Sheikh (which permits control of the Straits of Tiran) on the East, and by the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the west. The Sinai Peninsula forms the land bridge between Asia and Africa and thus has been a region of strategic importance throughout history. Sinai is divided into the following areas: The northern region which is flat and sandy and stretches from Rafah and Nitzana all the way along the Mediterranean coast to the line of the Suez Canal.

The central region includes Wadi-El-Arish. On the west side of this region there are the Gidi and Mitla Passes which are control points for most of this area.

The southern region is a mountainous area which is very limited to modern warfare. Its importance came from the fact that this region controls the shores of both the Gulf of Suez and the Gulf of Eilat. The most important point in this region is the southern tip of Sinai, Sharm-El-Sheikh, which controls the entrance to the Gulf of Eilat.

The Sinai Peninsula is a large area which can accommodate large numbers of forces and afford them the space to maneuver and conduct modern warfare. There is some key terrain of strategic importance, such as, the Suez Canal --a water barrier and a very strong obstacle, the height of the Gidi and Mitla Passes which extend some 30 kilometers and the triangle of El Aiesh-Bir Hassaneh-Kuntillah which contains most of the routes that connect Sinai with the southern region of Israel--the Negev. This area borders with the Gebel Ya'alak and includes Mounts Libne, Hilal, Kusseimah, and Kadesh Barnea. Control of this triangle is vital from the viewpoint of the defence of southern Israel.

E. Defensible Borders.

Israel desires and needs defensible borders. Practically all nations expend great efforts to ensure the integrity of their borders and the safety of their populations. Israel, as a small country in size and population has to take more care than others regarding the security of her borders. She has good reason to be cautious and to

insist on borders that are not only recognized by her neighbors but which are also defensible.

Until the 1973 Yom Kippur-War Israel compensated for her numerical inferiority by qualitative forces. In the 1973 War Israel, who was attacked by Egypt and Syria, learned the lesson that defensible borders were mainly what saved her from disaster.

The Israeli need for defensible borders was formally recognized by the international community in November 1967 through Security Council Resolution 242, which both Israel and the Arab States have accepted as the basis for a peace settlement. Resolution 242 states, in part, that "territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force."¹⁴

The United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Arthur Goldberg also explained the importance of the defensible boundaries on 15 November 1967. He said:

Historically, there have never been secure or recognized boundaries in the area. Neither the Armistice lines of 1949 nor the cease-fire lines of 1967 have answered that description. . . . such boundaries have yet to be agreed upon. An agreement on that point is an absolute essential to a just and lasting peace. . . . history shows that imposed boundaries are not secure and that secure boundaries must be mutually worked out and recognized by the parties themselves as part of the peace-making process.¹⁵

Concerning the importance of strategic depth, many claim that the sophisticated weaponry of modern warfare negates the value of defensible borders with strategic depth. The Reality has shown that the opposite is true. Recent military history teaches us some facts, such as, the German "blitz" did not knock England out of World War II and heavy Allied air bombardments did not bring Germany to its knees. The latter happened only when the last bunker in Berlin fell. The massive American air bombardments in Vietnam did not bring about victory. However, the basic truth remains that without ground forces no war can be decisive and ground forces need strategic depth.

Coming to the key point of defensible borders, Israel cannot return to the 1949-1967 Armistice lines.¹⁶ Their very nature invited aggression and failed to provide Israel with the essential minimum of strategic depth. Within those lines, a single military strike would have been sufficient to dissect Israel at more than one location. In summarizing this point, Israel's right to defensible borders cannot be realized within the 1949-1967 Armistice lines because:

- 1) Israel has neither the manpower nor the economic capability to man those lines. (See map 1-5.)

- 2) Along the 1949-1967 Armistice Lines, there is no strategic depth which is a decisive factor in modern conventional warfare.

3) To assure her survival behind those lines, Israel must adopt the means for preemptive strikes. Therefore, even a peace settlement must be based on defensible borders.

Indefensible borders in this case means an open invitation to hostile activities which will most assuredly be followed by war.

Thus, the logical question becomes: what are the defensible borders? From Israel's viewpoint, the defensible borders are those which will give strategic depth and good topographical conditions under which the small active Israeli Defence Force will be able to hold any enemy invasion until the reserve units can be mobilized to the front lines.

F. Prospects for Peace.


The biggest advance toward peace was accomplished toward the end of 1977 when the leaders of Egypt and Israel overcame years of hate and deeply rooted psychological barriers and met face to face, first in Jerusalem and later in Ismailia.

Egyptian President Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat showed personal courage by being not only the first but the only Arab leader to turn from the way of war to the way of understanding and negotiation. His personal initiative brought the two countries into direct negotiations while peace with other Arab States still seems to be far away.

So far this problem is much too difficult to be solved within months or even years. This is a question of life or death for both sides. This is a conflict in which all Arab States are involved on one side against Israel. We are talking about an area and a conflict in which the best policy-makers and military experts were wrong when they tried to predict what would happen. In the Middle East area, wars have broken out almost without warning. States all over the world were surprised again and again because of what happened in this area. Also, internal and external factors both in Egypt and Israel influenced both sides. These factors are discussed in the chapters that follow.


Finally, in spite of the peace between Egypt and Israel and the efforts of the United States to bring the other Arab States into the peace circle, the question one must ask is: What shall prevail in the area--peace or war?

The effort throughout this thesis is to analyze certain reasons for the conflict, to study closely the conflict itself, and finally conclude whether or not the other Arab States will come into the peace circle or if another war is unavoidable?



MAP 1-1

SOURCE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, UNITED STATES.




MAP 1-2

SOURCE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, UNITED STATES.


THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

Some basic facts



MAP 1-3

SOURCE: CARTA JERUSALEM.



GALILEE-KINNERET-GOLAN HEIGHTS CROSS SECTION







FIGURE 1-1

SOURCE: CARTA JERUSALEM.



1949-1967 ARMISTICE LINES

WITH DETAILED VIEW
OF DISTANCE FACTORS
FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES (1977)



CHAPTER 2

MILITARY STRUGGLE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT SINCE THE 1948 WAR

The military struggle between the Arab States and Israel can not be identified exactly when it began and no one can say what day it will end. For our purposes, it is a conflict which began in the nineteen-forties and has now developed into a most difficult period.

A. Israel's War of Independence (1948-1949).

The war of 1948 began, as a matter of fact, as a civil war between the Arab and Jewish communities after November 29, 1947, when the General Assembly approved the partition plan of Palestine between the Jews and Arabs. Roads were mined, settlements isolated, convoys ambushed, and other hostile activities carried out. On May 14, 1948, the eve of the end of British rule, the people's council and representatives of the Yishuv¹⁷ met and declared the establishment of the State of Israel. They also approved the formation of a provisional government. The neighboring Arab States, who believe that the land of Palestine belongs to the Palestinians, could not accept the General Assembly's decision and the Jewish declaration; therefore, on the following morning, May 14, the Jewish State was invaded by the regular armies of Egypt,

Transjordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and contingents from Saudi Arabia. The invaders' armies almost succeeded in defeating Israel. In the North, the Syrian army advanced westward into Upper Galilee and almost "amputated Galilee's finger".¹⁸ In the South the Egyptian army reached to within 30 kilometers South of Tel-Aviv, the central and most populous city of Israel. On the central front, Jerusalem was besieged by Arab forces.¹⁹ The Iraqi forces advanced and reached a point 15 kilometers from the Mediterranean and threatened to cut Israel in two (see map 2-1). Throughout the war the situation changed with each side having the advantage in turn but, finally, the Israeli forces succeeded in overcoming her foes. At the very high cost of over six thousand Israeli dead, the Arab armies were driven back to the lines shown in map 2-2.

During 1949, separate bilateral armistice agreements were signed between Israel and the states of Egypt (Feb. 49), Lebanon (Mar. 49), Jordan (April 49), and Syria (July 49).

In each agreement the stated purpose was to make efforts to advance from an armistice to a permanent peace.

The 1949 armistice lines remained the borders between Israel and the Arab States until June 1967. It is noteworthy that at the end of the 1948 War the Arab States got less territory than they would have had if they had accepted the partition resolution (see maps 2-3).²⁰

After armistice agreements were signed one who read their content could hope and believe that these would lead to peace agreements. Instead, seven years later another war between Egypt and Israel broke out. Eighteen years later, war again broke out but this time between Israel and the States of Syria, Jordan and Egypt. Many hostile activities took place between the wars; however, with the relative quiet which came immediately after each war, hopes for a lasting peace were renewed.

Israel regarded the armistice agreements as a step toward peace, while the Arabs who, in their opinion, lost territory regarded them as a temporary measure. Immediately after the War of Independence, the Israeli parliament recognized the right of every Jew to live in Israel as a fundamental principle of the Jewish State. In 1950 the Law of Return gave automatic citizenship to every Jewish newcomer. Many of the newcomers were housed in Maabarot²¹ and in cooperative Moshav²² around the borders. The settlement of the Israeli countryside continued and many arid areas began developing and blooming. On the other hand, the Palestinians and Arab States decided to act under the policy of attrition which was designed to disrupt normal life in Israel. Ambassador Abba Eban's statement to the U. N. Security Council on October 30, 1956 describes very well what happened in the Southern Sector between Egypt and Israel:

During the six years during which this belligerency has operated in violation of the Armistice Agreement there have occurred 1,843 cases of armed robbery and theft, 1,339 cases of armed clashes with Egyptian armed forces, 435 cases of incursion from Egyptian controlled territory, 172 cases of sabotage perpetrated by Egyptian military units and fedayeen in Israel. As a result of these actions of Egyptian hostility within Israel, 364 Israelis were wounded and 101 killed.²³

On July 26, 1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal. In reality, the Canal had been closed to Israeli shipping since the end of the 1948 war. In addition to closing the canal, Egypt controlled the Tiran Straits by installing artillery at Sharm El-Sheikh. No Israeli shipping was permitted to enter into the Gulf of Eilat (Akaba).

B. Sinai Campaign (1956).

In October 1956, Jordan joined the Egyptian-Syrian pact. Israel, from her point of view, could not accept this situation. Therefore, she acted with the following main objectives:²⁴

- 1) Destruction of the Egyptian logistics establishments and airfields. This action was intended to disrupt the capability of Egypt, Syria and Jordan to attack during the short term.

- 2) Opening the Gulf of Eilat to undisturbed Israeli shipping through the Tiran Straits.

- 3) Destruction of the fedayeen forces and their bases in the Gaza Strip and on the Sinai border.

At 1700 hours, October 29, 1956 the Israeli army entered the Sinai Peninsula and conducted the campaign in three phases: the opening phase, the decisive phase and the exploitation. The campaign was carried out along 5 axis (see map 2-4):

- 1) The Northern axis: Ralah-El Arish-toward Kantara.
- 2) The central axis: Kuseima-Bir Gafgafa-toward Ismailia.
- 3) The Southern axis: Kuntilla-Mitle Pass.
- 4) Axis of Gaza Strip.
- 5) Axis of Eilat, along the Gulf of Eilat, to Sharm el-Sheikh and the Tiran Straits.

Between October 29, and November 5, 1956, the Israeli army occupied the Sinai peninsula and the Gaza Strip. It accomplished the three objectives as mentioned previously. In the beginning of 1957, Israel was forced by the United States and the Soviet Union to withdraw from the Sinai. Israel expected that Egyptian forces would not return to the Gaza Strip, but they did return a few days after Israeli troops withdrew. Israel was also promised that the Suez Canal would be open for Israeli goods but this promise was not kept either. Free shipping through the Straits of Tiran was economically important for Israel. Therefore, she gave warning that interference

with that freedom in the Straits of Tiran or the Gulf of Eilat would be a casus belli.²⁵

England and France also took part in the Sinai Campaign, but their political motives were quite different from those of Israel. The coordination among Israel, England and France was military in nature and confined to tactics and timing.²⁶

After the Sinai Campaign, there was less hope than after the 1948 War. Just a few years later, in 1959, even other nations' ships carrying goods for Israel were not permitted to pass through the Suez Canal.

Two Arab Summit Conferences took place, in 1964 and 1965, to consider the Arab-Israeli conflict. Beginning in 1964, groups of the Al-Fatah Organization began crossing Israeli borders and operating inside Israel. Fatah raids came particularly from Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Raids over the Egyptian border were less frequent because of the U. N. forces stationed there.

Arab Summit Conferences in January and September of 1964 resulted in the decision to divert the headwaters of the Jordan River to deprive Israel of the water she needed for her existence.²⁷ Israeli forces repeatedly attacked the workers who tried to divert the water until work was stopped toward the end of 1964. The tension became extremely high from April 1967 onward, when Syrian artillery shelled Israeli villages from the Golan Heights which

resulted in the Israeli air force operating against the Syrians.

Syria and Moscow influenced President Abdal Nasser of Egypt to take part in the struggle against Israel and from that time no one controlled the situation.²⁸ Each side carried out actions against the other side to protect itself. President Nasser had seven divisions moved from the west side of the Suez Canal to the Sinai. Israel took this act into account, moved forces to the borders, and made preparations to call up the reserve army. On May 16, 1967, President Nasser demanded that the United Nations Emergency Force withdraw. On May 22, he announced that the Straits of Tiran were closed for all shipping to and from Israel. Iraq, Syria and Jordan began to mobilize their armies along Israel's frontiers. On May 30, Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol offered King Hussein of Jordan neutrality, but the King refused it and placed his forces under Egyptian control.²⁹

C. Six-Day War (1967)

A very interesting question is whether or not the Arab States, with Egypt as their leader, even intended to go to all out war in June 1967. Analysis of the causes show that the war began and continued with false information, statements and movements of forces until a point was reached where there was no turning back. Briefly, we can identify the following reasons for the Six-Day War:

1) False reports were spread concerning concentrations of Israeli forces on the Syrian border even though reports of United Nations observers denied the presence of any such forces.³⁰

2) As a result of the false reports Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and were located on the Israeli frontier. On May 16, 1967 Cairo Radio declared, "The existence of Israel has continued too long We welcome the battle that we have long awaited."³¹

3) Upon Egypt's demand, the United Nations Emergency Force was withdrawn.

4) Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran.

5) An alliance was formed by Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan against Israel. On May 26, 1967 President Nasser said in his speech,

The Arab people want to fight. We have been waiting for the right day when we would be fully prepared recently, we have felt strong enough to triumph, with God's help, if we enter into battle with Israel. On that basis, we have decided to take the actual measures. Taking this step makes it imperative that we be ready to embark on a total war with Israel.³²

On June 5, the war broke out. The Israel Defence Force (IDF) conducted the war on the Egyptian frontier in three phases (see map 2-5):

1) The phase of break-through on the Northern and central axes.

2) Occupation of the Passes and blocking the axes to prevent the enemy forces from withdrawing.

3) The advance and pursuit toward the Suez Canal and clearing the enemy in the zone of the Gulf of Suez.

The Israel Defence Force held the Sinai Peninsula, Judea and Samaria, and the Golan Heights. The Straits of Tiran were opened again to international and Israeli navigation. Cease fire lines were established along the Suez Canal, the Jordan River, and the Golan Heights.

In September 1967, leaders of the Arab States held a summit meeting in Khartoum, Sudan. Their decision resulted in the "three no's"--no peace, no negotiations, and no recognition of Israel.³³ On the other hand, Israel, which has never known defensible borders but armistice lines, took as its objective peace within secure borders. Nothing changed the position taken by each side, not even the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 which included the following principles:

Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; termination of all claims or states of belligerency; and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats of acts of force.³⁴

Each Side understood the word "territories" in a different way.³⁵

Again hopes and expectations were disappointed.
Again hostile actions lead to the long war of Attrition.

D. War of Attrition (1969-1970).

There are many that try to define the War of Attrition in terms of time and place. Some say this war lasted for the entire year; others define it as between April 1969 and August 1970. Some consider the "War of Attrition" as occurring only in the Southern sector; others consider it to have occurred along the entire cease-fire lines. Generally, we can say that the War of Attrition was conducted along the entire cease-fire lines, but mainly along the Suez Canal. In fact, just a few weeks after the "Six-Day War", exchanges of fire began throughout the entire Egyptian-Israeli sector. These battles, from day to day, took different forms and became more and more intensive, particularly after March 1969. Massive artillery exchanges and other military operations were almost a daily occurrence in this intense conflict along the Suez Canal. Egyptian ambushes were carried out along the roads on the East Bank of the Canal. Also, the Israel Defence Force carried out raids deep inside Egyptian territory. During this period thousands of armed clashes took place on the Sinai front. Hundreds were killed, thousands became casualties on both sides. Losses of equipment and supplies were valued in the millions of dollars. In addition to so many losses, the Egyptians

evacuated hundreds of thousands of inhabitants from the cities along the Suez Canal.³⁶ During the first part of 1970, the number of Soviet military personnel in Egypt was increased to 15,000.³⁷ No one, at that time, could imagine that two years later, in July 1972, all these Soviet military personnel would be expelled from Egypt when President Sadat succeeded President Nasser after his death in September 1970.

Finally, on August 2, 1970, a cease fire agreement between Egypt and Israel was arranged through the efforts of the United States. The agreement was for a three-month period and it had to be extended every three months. In this case there was no hope for a permanent agreement or peace. The lessons were very bitter. Again, unfortunately, each side tried to get new equipment, to reorganize its forces, and to change the balance of power in its own favor, or at least not to be inferior to the other.

E. Yom Kippur War (1973).

On October 6, 1973, the holiest day of the Jewish year--Yom Kippur, Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated attack against Israel on the Suez Canal and Golan Heights fronts. During the first two to three days of the war, the small, active Israeli army which was strategically surprised, defended along both fronts and tried to stop the invading armies with a ratio of nearly 1:10 or more in favor of the attacker.³⁸ The Israeli reserve units were

organized and mobilized as fast as possible to reinforce the regular forces and were sent into combat in a very hasty manner.

The question regarding Egyptian war objectives is still under discussion from the Israeli viewpoint. However, there are a few points, which by general consensus are considered as objectives of this war:

1) The war was intended to break the deadlock of no-war, no-peace in the Middle East.³⁹

2) There was a territorial objective, to occupy as much area as possible in the Sinai. This was to be done in the following phases.

a. Crossing the Suez Canal and occupying the southern part of the Sinai and a strip of land 10 kilometers deep on the East bank of the Suez Canal.

b. Consolidating and reorganizing before proceeding to the next phase.

c. Penetrating to the east and occupying the Passes Mitla and Gidi, Bir-Gafgafa, and the northern axis with armored divisions.

3) From President Sadat's speech on September 26, 1973, we can deduce another objective: the Palestinian issue.⁴⁰

Two quotations clarify what has been mentioned previously. In his speech before the People's Assembly on October 16, 1973, President Sadat said,

We have fought and shall fight to liberate our lands, which the Israeli occupation has held since 1967, and find the way to restore the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. . . . We are prepared to agree to a cease fire on the basis of withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied lands immediately under international supervision, to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines.⁴¹

While addressing the armed forces of Egypt, Minister of War, General Ismail Ali said,

Leap ahead, our brave soldiers, to complete your mission. . . the liberation of every grain of sand defiled by the enemy's feet, regardless of the efforts and sacrifices, and regardless of how long the battle may continue. Fulfill the hopes of Egypt and the Arab nation. Know that you are not alone in your fight. Everyone is anxious to fight on your side. . . .⁴²

Having examined Egyptian objectives, it is appropriate to discuss the combat actions.

After very difficult days in defence, the IDF succeeded in "carrying the ball" to the west bank by crossing the Suez Canal, penetrating into Egyptian territory, and enveloping Egyptian forces by striking deep to the west and south.

On October 16, 1973, in her speech to the Knesset,⁴³ which had been called into special session, Prime Minister Golda Meir said, "There is no doubt in our minds that war was launched once more against the very existence of the Jewish state. . . . The armies of Egypt and Syria, with the help of the Arab States . . . went to war with the aim of reaching the lines of June 4, 1967 on

their way to achieving their main purpose--the conquest and destruction of Israel."⁴⁴

The first days of the war were decisive. Placing her hope in the IDF's ability to stabilize this desperate situation, Prime Minister Golda Meir spoke to the Israeli people over radio and television on October 6, 1973: "I am confident that none among us will fall prey to panic. . . . We must be ready for every burden and sacrifice needed for the defence of our survival, our freedom and our independence. Let us, then, conduct ourselves so as to be worthy of our soldiers of Israel who are valiantly doing their duty . . . along the lines of fire in all sectors."⁴⁵

Finally after 19 days of terrible fighting and a series of brilliant military actions, the IDF advanced towards the Cairo-Suez road and contained the Egyptian Third Army. This new situation caused the Egyptians to ask for a cease-fire.

United Nations Resolutions 338 and 339 made on October 22 and 23, respectively called for an immediate cease-fire and for the implementation of Resolution 242.⁴⁶ (See Appendix A.)

Israel accepted the cease-fire because it had endured three weeks of bitter fighting and had sustained grievous casualties.⁴⁷

In response to the UN decision, the cease-fire took place on October 24. On November 11, the cease-fire agreement was signed between Egypt and Israel at kilometer 101 on the Cairo-Suez road. (See map 2-6.) This agreement was not the last one. On January 18, 1974, a separation of forces agreement was entered into between Egypt and Israel. Each side had to accomplish its part by March 1, 1974. In accordance with this agreement, Israel withdrew its forces from the west bank of the canal and United Nations forces entered an almost 11 kilometer-wide belt between the Egyptian forces on the east bank and the Israeli forces. (See map 2-7.)

Following this separation agreement came the Israel-Egypt Agreement on September 1, 1975 (See map 2-8) which was followed by a Peace Treaty on March 26, 1979. From a military aspect, the war which had begun under the worst conditions for Israel, resulted in a victory. From their viewpoint, the Egyptians also claimed the 73 War as a victory. This is why they were willing to enter into negotiations for peace. There was no celebration of victory or of having been saved from so great a danger because thousands had been killed or had become casualties.

It is a known fact that there is no war without loss of human life which is always the most painful aspect on any side. The family which has lost a son feels that it has lost the whole war and the entire world.

The characteristics of this war can be summarized as follows:

- 1) Both surprise and the initiative were in Egyptian and Syrian hands.
- 2) The two armies, those of Egypt and Syria, had coordinated strategies and tactics.
- 3) Both Arab armies had the advantage of short lines of communication. They fought close to their bases, while Israel had long lines of supply.
- 4) The Egyptian operational achievement of crossing the Suez Canal was exceptional.
- 5) The success of Egyptian intelligence and their deception was noteworthy.

By briefly summarizing the military struggle between Israel and Egypt since the 1948 War, one can see great suffering, hostility, death and destruction of resources, which are very difficult to replace. Every few years war flared up. After the war hopes and expectations were raised for any change. Instead of change another war came. After so many bloody wars in such a short time, the Arab-Israeli conflict is still far from any final settlement. A lot of hostile emotions and hostile intentions remain. The critical question is whether the Yom Kippur War was the last in the series or just one link in a seemingly endless chain of bloody wars. Whether this region will now progress towards peace or will go on to another war is still in doubt.

As one who took part in these wars and who lives in this area and feels the burden and pain of the results of war, I believe that the people on both sides, Jews and Arabs, in the depth of their hearts desire peace. They need it; they deserve it.

THE ARAB INVASION 1948.



MAP 2-1

SOURCE: CARTA JERUSALEM

1949 ARMISTICE LINES

SYRIA

LEBANON

Sour (Tyre) Metulla Banyas Quneitra

Nahariya Akko

HAIFA

Netanya

TEL AVIV YAFO

Ashdod Gaza

Amman

JORDAN

ISRAEL

Mediterranean Sea

Port Said

El Arish

Abu Aweigila

Quseima

Bir Gafgafa

SINAI

Suez Canal

Suez

Eilat

Aqaba

EGYPT



SAUDI ARABIA

El Tur

MAP 2-2
SOURCE: CARTA JERUSALEM

38


MAP 2-2
SOURCE: CARTA JERUSALEM



MAP 2-3


SOURCE: TIME, APRIL 14, 1980 P. 48.

OCTOBER 1973 CEASE - FIRE.




MAP 2-6

SOURCE: CARTA JERUSALEM.



MAP 2-7
SOURCE: CARTA JERUSALEM.

ISRAEL-EGYPT AGREEMENT INITIALED ON 1.9.1975



MAP 2-8

SOURCE: ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCE, GENERAL STAFF, T.A.

CHAPTER 3

EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCED CHANGE.

A. External Factors

1) Arab States--Israel: Balance of Power.

There are many questions about this region that lack answers. Friends and enemies of both sides are divided over estimates of the relative power of each.

Each side believes that the other is more aggressive when it is stronger. Therefore the arms race in this area is a process without end. Instead of being spent for food, clothing and housing for the people who need these things, resources are used more and more for weapons. Still there are some facts from which distinctions may be drawn:

a. Israel is alone even though it has the support of the world's Jewish communities and a few friendly states, it is still only one small country within a very hostile area. From the Israeli viewpoint it is much more difficult to identify who the enemy is: Is the enemy the Muslim countries; the twenty Arab States who are members of the Arab League; the Arab States which surround Israel; or any other combination? The strength of Israel's enemies depends on who they are, on how they are combined, and on the degree to which they are united.

b. The following table shows the area and population of belligerent Arab States and other Arab League States as they compare to Israel. One can calculate the relationship between both sides:

Arab States--Israel Strength (1978)

	State	Area in sq. km.	Popula- tion	Regular* Army
Confron- tation States	Egypt	1,000,000	40,000,000	395,000
	Syria	185,180	7,210,000	227,500
	Jordan	90,640	1,500,000	67,850
	Lebanon	10,400	2,800,000	7,800
	Iraq	444,000	12,171,000	212,000
	Sub- Total	1,730,220	63,681,000	910,150
Other Arab League States	Other 15 Arab States	12,783,810	80,637,000	400,410
Arab League States	Total	14,514,030	144,318,000	1,310,560
	Israel	78,870	3,590,000	164,000 (+400,000 reserve)

Source: Middle East Information Center, The Guide to Arab World, Jerusalem, 1978.

*The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1978-1979, London.

Table 3-1

Concerning the aforementioned data, the total Arab States' strength, aggregated on the basis of 3 brigades or equivalent formations to a division, comes to 44 divisions with 9,800 tanks and a total of 1,880 combat aircraft (see Map 3-1, Table 3-1).

From the viewpoint of Israel both the overtly hostile Arab States and other supporting elements should be taken into account when calculating the enemy threat. For example, in the Yom Kippur War, Egypt and Syria were aided actively by the Arab States and others including Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan and Lebanon. Additional support was provided on a more limited basis by North Koreans, Pakistanis, North Vietnamese and Cubans.

c. The fact that most of the units of the Israel Defence Force are reserve must be kept in mind. The Arab armies are composed mainly of regular forces.

d. Large areas give the Arab States strategic depth. The size of their population and the advantages in resources give them strategic ability to keep fighting for a long time, if needed.

e. The ratio of forces should be examined by; number of soldiers, number of units, the quality of the weapons, and training level of the armies. This force ratio between the Arab States and Israel fluctuated during the period, but it was always in favor of the Arab States.

f. Defensible borders increase the strength of any nation, and particularly a small nation. Therefore, "defensible borders" is a major issue for Israel (see Map 3-2).

2) Russia and the Middle East.

To understand the Soviet goals and policies in the Middle East, we must look at the background and historical development of her policies. While the doctrine of the West makes a distinction between the democratic and non-democratic world, the Soviet Union divides the world into two camps--capitalist and communist. Twenty to thirty years ago, the Soviet interests in the Middle East were relatively limited. They were much more active in places such as India and Black Africa. Recently, however, they have been looking for more options and greater flexibility in the event of a confrontation with the West anywhere in the world and particularly in the Middle East. For this reason they have developed and continue to develop strategic weapons systems including a sizable blue water Navy. The increased Soviet presence in the Middle East with its growing number of support bases and air protection, seems to be a link in the chain of global flexibility: the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, East Africa, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf (see Map 3-3).

It is likely that oil is the major reason for the Soviet presence in the Middle East (see Figure 3-3 and 3-6).⁴⁸ Controlling these oil reserves would both aid Russia and throttle Europe and the United States.⁴⁹ The Soviets are aware of U.S. fears of a "hot" conflict in the Middle East. Therefore, their tactics have been to play on these fears of confrontation. The Soviets promote

building up tension in this area within certain limits; long drawn-out talks between the sides, perhaps "cease-fire" agreements with continuing hostilities; however, they are careful not to endanger their position by allowing rapid escalation or an agreement. This policy of the Soviet Union is a negative factor and can delay the course of peace. In spite of Sadat's steps in July 1972, which dismissed the Soviet military advisers, Russia clarified two points through the 1973 War. First, the Arab States owe their success, whatever it is, to Russian arms, Russian aid, and Russian political backing. Second, the Soviet interests in the Middle East justify their risking direct intervention. Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union is looking for and expects to be able to establish a position of control in the region, including an advisory role to the Arabs on how, when, and for what purpose, they should use the oil weapon. The Russian position on the Palestinian question has been essentially pragmatic and dictated primarily by its interests. Mr. Augustus R. Norton, observed,

The dynamic aspect of Soviet policy vis-a-vis the Palestinian question has been due to a shift particularly since the 1973 War, in Soviet appreciation of the utility of the Palestinian question and of the P.L.O. for Soviet policy . . . the growing Soviet interest in the Palestinians . . . began with Sadat's expulsion of a major portion of Soviet advisors from Egypt in July 1972, became more pronounced after the October 1973 War as a result of the Egyptian-U.S. rapprochement, the capture by the U.S. of the predominant role in the negotiations.⁵⁰

By identifying itself with the Palestinians, the Soviet Union hopes to gain from either the possibility of failure to reach a settlement as well as from a solution to the problem.

3) United States Policy in Middle East.

Before World War II the United States regarded the Middle East as an area of British responsibility. But from the time of the end of British Mandate in this region and recognition of Israel as a State in 1948, the United States has been involved in every important act which takes place in this area. The core of U.S. policy is to support self-determination and freedom for all nations. The United States assists every nation in this region which needs and wants her assistance.⁵¹ This assistance is given on the basis of a country's needs--not exclusively for the benefit the United States can derive from it.

The United States helped Israel with the economic burdens which were created mainly by security needs and the immigration of the Jewish refugees from Arab countries and Europe. She also contributed approximately 50 percent of the money which U.N.R.W.A.⁵² has distributed to care for the Arab refugees.

Unfortunately, not only economic aid is needed in this area but military assistance as well. The United States, which has the world's best military equipment, bases her policy on the principle of defensive needs, not

offensive needs.⁵³ The United States is almost the only seller who says many times to her customers, "In spite of your good money, you do not need the weapons." This policy, which is intended to bring peace and stability to this area, is not an easy one because the Soviet Union is ready to assist every country which will give her a political or military benefit in the area. There is no formula for carrying out this policy, continuing to insulate the Middle East region from Soviet penetration and safeguarding the freedom of western nations and oil reserves so important to the economies of Western Europe and the United States. Russia is not yet subjected to similar pressures because of oil. The Soviet Union is looking for any opportunity to penetrate deep into the Middle East area. Furthermore, as mentioned before, this is a link in the Russian chain of global flexibility and influence: the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and East Africa, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Their justification for this policy could be to protect their southern flank or to be able to react to any possibilities of U.S. intervention in the Middle East. Soviet aims cannot be achieved by creating peace and quiet in this region.⁵⁴ Therefore, they are interested in the Arab States' dependence on their military, economic, and political assistance. This explains why Soviet strategy is to build up tension, promote long, drawn-out talks and encourage hostile actions along the cease-fire line.

By preventing both agreement and rapid escalation of conflict, Soviet interests are served.

The U.S. policy makers should understand, react and consider these Russian goals. The Palestinian issue is a very important one, but it is not the core of the Middle East conflict with respect to Soviet interests. The United States should increase the confidence of the free nations in this region in her capability and intention to protect them from Soviet penetration and activities. This confidence has been shaken since the revolution in Iran, the developments in the Horn of Africa, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

4) Other Factors.

a. There are some basic differences in the approach of each side concerning the conflict. The Palestinians adopted the doctrine of conducting hostile actions: a policy of terror and disruption of normal life in Israel. They are guided by the example of the F.L.N. and the French in Algeria. While they see the Zionists as analogous to the French on Algerian land, the Israelis see themselves as "Frenchmen on French land." Therefore, no force will be able to expel them from Israeli land as no force could persuade the French to leave their own country--France. One should try to "stand in the shoes" of each side to understand the core of the problem. In the example mentioned previously, it was clear: who is who--who is Algerian, and who is French; what is Algeria, and what is France. In the Palestine conflict, the terms

"land," "people," "history," and "new" are under discussion. Each side has its own point of view not only concerning what these words mean but also concerning the entire problem.

b. Oil.

The world's economic need for Middle East oil makes this area very important. Many countries who import most of their oil from the Middle East are critically dependent on this area. (For oil details see Tables 3-2, 3-3, Figure 3-3 and Map 3-4.)

The wars in the Middle East are not limited to terms of military balance of power on territories and borders. The oil was used very wisely as a weapon to influence the Middle East struggle by forcing most of the oil-dependent states to support the interests of the Arab States. It can be understood why areas like Western Europe, Japan and the major American oil companies began to support the Arab side.

Not only oil-dependent states but also other states are very interested in this oil. As mentioned previously, the Soviet Union may soon become a competitor for Middle East Oil. The only way that the Soviets can control these oil resources, without danger of major confrontation with the United States and Western Countries is to increase her influence in the Arab world.

c. The chain of wars in the Middle East, in which every link was a tragedy, taught the Israeli leaders that

the wars would lead nowhere. It also taught the Arab leaders that it is not an easy mission to destroy and exterminate the Israeli people by military means. Therefore, a few of them became less extreme. Others made arrangements to ensure Soviet support in an emergency situation in order to reject any settlement and gamble on a war to win everything. If such a gamble fails, they may insist on a cease-fire and with the support of the Soviet Union go back to the original settlement or make a better compromise.

d. The Palestinian factor will be covered in another chapter.

B. Internal Factors in Egypt.

The Egyptian economic problem should be considered as a first priority. Egypt's area is 1,000,000 square kilometers but only 5 percent of this area is cultivated.⁵⁵ The Aswan Dam was supposed to increase the cultivated area from 5 percent to 35 percent, but this has not yet occurred.⁵⁶ The population of Egypt is approximately 38 million. Nearly 47 percent of the Egyptian labor force works in agriculture. Around 70 percent of the population is illiterate. There is one medical doctor per 1700 persons and one hospital bed for every 500 persons.⁵⁷ The defense budget is one more serious burden (in 1975/76 it was \$6.103 milliard). The wars have never made this burden easier and have prevented the government from doing enough to improve living conditions.

A point which should be considered is that the sudden turning from a hostile path to peace came from President Sadat before the support of his people was obtained. It will take time until the people of both sides get used to the idea. The idea of peace between the people and not only between the leaders is very important.⁵⁸

In the Egyptian political system no one can know what the President's assistants really think and what the position of his successor will be. However, there are a few factors in Egypt which operate against the peace, e.g., the Muslim brotherhood, the student organizations in the universities, and a few opposition leaders.

Initial enthusiasm over the Peace Treaty has been followed by the bitter reality and difficulties of making peace. On February 8, 1980 the Israeli Defense Minister, Mr. Weizman, said in an interview in Yediot, an Israeli newspaper, "My estimate is that the Russians will make every effort to bring down President Sadat and to hurt Egypt. All the region is in high tension. We have to be concerned and to take care. Can you imagine what will happen if the Russians succeed in bringing down President Sadat?"⁵⁹

In the view of the Arab League States, President Sadat is a traitor: he turned from Pan-Arabian unity to Israel. One can assume that in these circumstances some Arabs are willing to make every effort to hurt him. President Sadat took a very courageous and exceptional


step. He is the only one who was strong enough to choose the road to peace. Our hope is that he will keep advancing and that his successor will continue his policies.

C. Internal Factors in Israel.


Israel, 32 years old, has seen wars more than many other countries. As a young state the economic burden of successive wars has been very heavy with respect to an unfavorable balance of payments. Despite the impact of the wars, Israel has tried to emphasize rapid growth of industrial production, exports, and water resources.⁶⁰ Another problem for Israel is immigration and integration.⁶¹ Hundreds of thousands of Jews from all over the world, particularly from the Arab States and Europe, have come to Israel. Under the Law of Return they have become Israeli citizens. The integration of immigrants in Israeli society, socially, economically and culturally is a very difficult mission. The issue of immigration is the core of the conflict from the viewpoint of the Palestinian.⁶² Presently, as before, there are some serious social problems in Israeli society. The problem calls for closing the social and cultural gaps between certain segments of the population. Efforts are proceeding in the fields of education, housing, and social welfare. Because Israel is a democratic country, the political parties are very active, particularly concerning the peace process. Most of the population supports the peace, but others do not want to pay for peace with insecure boundaries.

Secure boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors are a natural aim, but a point of dispute between Israel and its neighbors. To secure the boundaries in the Israeli view also means Jewish settlement along them, including settlement in Judaea and Samaria. Some Israelis charge that these settlements are "an obstacle to peace," and around this point there are many discussions and debates.⁶³ Many in Israel do not want to pay the price of giving up the settlements for peace. But still everyone worries about the loss of peace. On February 8, 1980 the Defense Minister, Mr. Wiesel said, "I recommend to try to understand the Egyptian side, their problems, their characteristics, their tradition and desires . . . not only the written peace treaty is important but also creation of understanding between the peoples is important."⁶⁴ The internal factors affecting both sides are not easy to understand. The Israeli and Egyptian people should try to overcome the obstacles on the way to real peace. Israelis and Arabs have much in common: ancient roots in the Middle East, similar languages, related cultures, and shared regional problems. After long conflict, the way appears to have been opened at last for a brighter and more promising future.

ARAB MILITARY STRENGTH ★



★ Divisions are aggregated on the basis of 3 brigades or equivalent formations to a division.



MAP 3-2

SOURCE: CARTA JERUSALEM.

[illegible]

SOURCE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, UNITED STATES.

THE STRATEGIC BALANCE 1978





FIGURE 3-1

SOURCE: THE YOUTH INSTITUTE FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1978

POPULATION OF ISRAEL



- ☑ Israel is the only Jewish country in the world.
- ☑ Jews have come to Israel from 101 countries.
- ☑ Israel is a refuge for Jews fleeing persecution.

FIGURE 3-2

SOURCE: THE YOUTH INSTITUTE FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1978.

World Oil Production and Consumption 1978 Million Tonnes




FIGURE 3-3

SOURCE: THE WORLD OIL MARKET IN THE YEAR AHEAD.




FIGURE 3-4

SOURCE: THE WORLD OIL MARKET IN THE YEAR AHEAD.

TABLE 3-2
SOURCE: THE WORLD OIL MARKET IN THE YEAR AHEAD

Inter-Area Total Oil Movements 1978.

To	From										Australasia	Japan	South East Asia	Africa	Western Europe	Latin America	Canada	U.S.A.	TOTAL EXPORTS	OTHER EASTERN HEMISPHERE	DESTINATION* NOT KNOWN	TOTAL
	U.S.A.	Canada	Latin America	Western Europe	Africa	South East Asia	Japan	Australasia	Other Eastern Hemisphere	Destination* Not Known												
	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.5	0.5	0.3	1.6	0.3	2.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	19.5
U.S.A.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Canada	22.9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	22.9
Latin America	114.3	14.6	18.8	18.3	1.3	—	0.8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	177.2
Western Europe	18.5	—	—	—	6.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	27.2
Middle East	113.6	13.6	74.4	429.3	21.2	79.6	198.1	12.1	25.4	7.6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	974.9
North Africa	62.6	—	9.6	84.5	0.7	—	0.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	161.0
West Africa	48.6	—	15.0	38.9	3.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	105.5
East and South Africa	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.5
South Asia	—	—	—	0.2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2
South East Asia	27.4	—	—	1.0	0.7	—	52.1	4.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	85.9
Japan	0.3	—	—	—	—	0.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.8
Australasia	0.5	—	—	—	—	0.5	1.8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.8
USSR, E. Europe & China	0.5	—	10.2	71.3	1.3	10.2	7.7	—	1.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	102.7
Total Imports	409.2	31.0	12.9	64.3	35.4	91.4	262.6	17.1	36.8	14.6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1681.1
Thousand Barrels Daily																						
U.S.A.	—	90	90	85	10	5	30	5	50	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	365
Canada	445	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	445
Latin America	2 225	290	360	345	25	—	15	—	40	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3 400
Western Europe	375	—	—	—	135	—	—	—	40	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	550
Middle East	2 300	275	1 525	8 685	425	1 610	4 010	250	515	135	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	19 730
North Africa	1 310	—	200	1 770	15	—	10	—	65	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3 370
West Africa	975	—	300	780	60	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2 115
East and South Africa	—	—	—	6	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10
South Asia	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6
South East Asia	570	—	—	20	15	—	1 085	100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1 790
Japan	5	—	—	—	—	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15
Australasia	10	—	—	—	—	10	35	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	55
USSR, E. Europe & China	10	—	200	1 395	25	200	160	—	30	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2 010
Total Imports	8 225	550	1 675	13 030	710	1 840	5 335	355	740	235	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	33 865

TABLE 3-3

SOURCE: THE WORLD OIL MARKET IN THE YEAR AHEAD

Imports and Exports 1978 Crude Oil and Products.

	Million Tonnes				Thousand Barrels Daily			
	Imports		Exports		Imports		Exports	
	Crude	Products	Crude	Products	Crude	Products	Crude	Products
U.S.A.	306.9	102.3	7.8	11.7	6 230	1 995	155	210
Canada	30.5	2.5	12.0	10.9	605	50	245	200
Latin America	121.7	11.1	73.8	103.4	2 460	215	1 430	1 970
Western Europe	588.2	60.0	13.3	13.9	11 925	1 165	265	285
Middle East	4.1	2.5	935.8	39.1	80	50	18 910	820
North Africa	2.9	4.0	155.8	5.2	60	80	3 260	110
West Africa	0.5	3.8	102.5	3.0	5	75	2 050	55
East and South Africa	22.2	2.0	—	0.5	450	40	—	10
South Asia	20.7	2.9	—	0.2	420	55	—	5
South East Asia	75.3	16.1	71.8	14.1	1 520	320	1 455	335
Japan	235.2	27.4	—	0.8	4 750	585	—	15
Australasia	11.1	6.0	—	2.8	225	130	—	55
U.S.S.R., E. Europe & China	2.9	3.7	57.0	45.7	60	75	1 145	865
*Destination not known	7.6	7.0	—	—	135	100	—	—
Total	1 429.8	251.3	1 429.8	251.3	28 925	4 935	28 925	4 935

*Includes increased quantities in transit, transit losses, minor movements not otherwise shown, military use, etc.

CHAPTER 4

PALESTINIAN FACTOR

With reference to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, paragraph A of the Framework of Peace in the Middle East states, "Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian People should participate in negotiation on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects."⁶⁵ There is no question about representatives for Egypt, Israel and Jordan. But who represents the Palestinian? In fact, the Palestinians have never been questioned about who they want to represent them as a community nor have they ever asked to elect authorized representatives. Therefore, there are a few factors which can be taken into account for representing the Palestinian interests:

A. Kingdom of Jordan as Palestinian's Representative.

The Government of Jordan has good reasons to represent the Palestinians.

- 1) Most of the Palestinians are Jordanian citizens and most of Jordan's citizens are Palestinians.

- 2) The Palestinian representation in Jordan's Government, Parliament, Senate and in civil servants comes to more than fifty percent.

3) There are close economic, social, family, and cultural ties between the Arab Palestinian inhabitants on both sides of the Jordan River. As a matter of fact, it is almost impossible to distinguish between these two sides.

4) The State of Jordan lost the areas of Judaea and Samaria in the 1967, Six-Day War.

5) Security Council Resolution 242 says that negotiations will be conducted between States.

On the other hand, the Israeli Government has on several occasions made known its readiness to accept Palestinian representation within the Jordanian delegation to the peace talks. The Israeli Cabinet also made a decision at a meeting on July 25, 1974 that stated,

Israel will continue to strive for peace agreements with the Arab States on the basis of defensible boundaries secured in negotiations held without prior conditions. The Government will work for negotiation for a peace agreement with Jordan. That agreement will be based on the existence of only two independent states--Israel with unified Jerusalem as its capital, and an Arab Jordanian Palestinian State east of Israel within boundaries to be fixed by negotiation between Israel and Jordan.⁶⁶

This shows a willingness of most of the Israelis to negotiate with Jordan as a representative of Palestinians rather than the P.L.O. or any other group.

B. Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.).

The P.L.O. is not an elected body of the Palestinians but was founded in 1964 at the suggestion of Egypt at the Arab Summit Conference.⁶⁷ In December 1973 by the


resolution of the Arab Summit Conference in Algeria, the P.L.O. was declared to be the body representative of the Palestinian nation.⁶⁸ In other words, the Arab States and not the Palestinians were the founders of the P.L.O. Therefore, we must ask ourselves if the P.L.O. has the legal right to represent the Palestinians' interests considering the way it was elected? From the time that this organization was founded, it has been financed and maintained by Arab Governments.⁶⁹ As an umbrella-organization for a number of the Palestinian groups (See figure 4-2), it has an Executive Committee which consists of fourteen members: two from the Fatah organization, one from the Saiqa organization, one from the Arab Liberation Front, one from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (Jibril), one from the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine--Hawatmeh's Front, one from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Habash's Front), one from the Palestinian Liberation Army, two Independents, and four from the Palestinian National Front in the West Bank which is linked with Fatah.

The Palestine Liberation Organization is a political framework which has as its major objective to serve as a recognized national representative of the Palestinian Arabs. This general framework encompasses in addition to the terrorist organization, various popular associations


or federations, e.g., Federation of Students, Federation of Teachers, etc. The P.L.O. succeeds in being a unified structure for all Palestinian organizations in spite of internal divisions. The majority of these organizations can be divided into two camps; one, that of the pro-Syrians such as Fatah, the Jibril Front and Saiqa. The second, that of the pro-Iraqis, all the Rejectionist Front organizations as noted in Figure 4-1.⁷⁰

The major sources of weapons for the organizations are the Eastern Bloc countries and the Arab States.⁷¹ The forces of the P.L.O. presently number approximately around ten thousand and are organized into regular and semi-regular units. Most of the active units of the organizations are deployed in southern Lebanon.

SOURCE: SEE ENDNOTE 72.



The P.L.O. as an Umbrella Organization



Source: Figure 4-1⁷³

Figure 4-2

1) Al Fatah, consisting of approximately 6,000 active persons, is the largest and most active of all Palestinian organizations.⁷⁴ With the beginning of the political process in the Middle East after the 1973 War, the P.L.O. adopted a pragmatic policy. It expressed readiness to participate in the negotiations in the Middle East with the intent of establishing a Palestinian State in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. However, Fatah has repeatedly stated that the realization of this stage will not include the recognition of Israel nor the signing of a peace with her. Fatah has publicly rejected the Judea-Samaria-Gaza Strip Autonomy plan which is suggested by the Israeli government.⁷⁵

2) El-Saiqa. It was established in 1968 and is headed by Zuhir Muhsin who is also a member of the Syrian Baath party leadership. The Saiqa organization was created by Syria for justifying its intervention in P.L.O. activities.⁷⁶ It continues to be operated under Syrian orders. The organization which consists of approximately 2,000 troops has maintained bases, camps, and headquarters in both Syria and Lebanon.⁷⁷

3) The Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.D.F.L.P.).

This organization was founded in 1969 as a result of a split from Habash's Front. After the Yom Kippur War, it supported the P.L.O. political process in the Middle

East. The P.D.F.L.P. relies primarily on financial support from Fatah and numbers over 1,000 troops.⁷⁸ The 'Democratic Front' is headed by Naif Hawatmeh.

4) The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.)--General Command.

It was founded in 1968 as a result of a break with Habash's 'Front' and is headed by Ahmed Jibril. With the outbreak of conflict in Lebanon, this organization was the most active in the Palestinian camps when it was aiding the leftist blocs in Lebanon. This organization which consists of between 300 to 500 troops operates with Libyan support and inspiration.⁷⁹

5) The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

It was founded in 1967 as a result of the unity of three small organizations. The organization, headed by George Habash, was the first group to carry out terrorist activities abroad such as the hijacking of the Air-France jet to Entebbe (July 1976) and the attack on Israeli Air Lines El-Al passengers in Istanbul (August 1976). It is supported by Iraq, South Yemen, Algeria and Libya.⁸⁰

This organization consists of approximately 1,000 troops and is a part of the Rejection Front* which, in principle, rejects the negotiation process and P.L.O. participation in it.

*This Front also includes the following groups:

- a. The Palestinian Liberation Front (Abu Abbas).
- b. Arab Liberation Front.
- c. The Popular Palestinian Struggle Front.

6) The Palestinian Liberation Front (P.L.F.).

This organization was founded by the faction which split off from Jibril's Front in April 1977 and is headed by Abu Abbas. The reasons for the split are connected to the Lebanese Civil War. When Ahmed Jibril took a pro-Syrian position, his organization's former spokesman Abu Abbas took a pro-Iraqi line and demanded that the organization actively operate against the Syrian forces in Lebanon. In April 1977, Jibril's organization split into two groups. The faction of Abu Abbas was called the Palestinian Liberation Front. It has about 300 members and is supported by Libya. In May 1977, this organization entered the Rejection Front replacing Jibril's Front.⁸¹

7) The Arab Liberation Front (A.L.F.).

This organization was established by the Iraqi Baath regime in 1969 in order to demonstrate the Iraqi participation in P.L.O. activities. It is headed by Abdel-Rahim Ahmed. The organization presently has a membership of several hundred, most of whom are in Lebanon. It is a part of the Rejection Front.⁸²

8) The Popular Palestinian Struggle Front.

This organization was established shortly after the Six-Day War by Bahjat Abu Gharbiya in the West Bank--Judea and Samaria and in the Gaza Strip. It is headed by Samir Gusha and numbers approximately 400 men. The majority of its operations are in Lebanon. Its political and material

supporters are Iraq and Libya. The Popular Palestinian Struggle Front belongs to the Rejection Front.⁸³

9) The Abu Nidal Group ('Black June').

This organization is a small faction of Fatah which split off in 1974. It is headed by Sabri el-Bana ('Abu Nidal') and operates out of Iraq and receives the protection of the Iraqi regime. It does not belong to the 'Rejection Front', but according to Sabri el-Banas' approach and ideology it can be clearly considered as a Rejection organization.

10) The Palestinian National Front (P.N.F.).

This organization was founded at the end of 1973. It is based upon the Jordanian Communist Party which was established on the West Bank--Judea and Samaria. The activities of this organization were limited as a result of the arrest and exile of its leaders who became members of the P.L.O. Executive Committee: Abd el-Muhsim abu Mayzer, Abd el-Jawad Salah and Dr. Walid Kamhawe.⁸⁴

11) The Palestinian Liberation Army (P.L.A.).

It was established as the military arm of the P.L.O. The P.L.A. is subordinate to the P.L.O. organization, and in principle its units are subordinate to the army of the nation upon whose territory they are located. The Chief of Staff of the P.L.A. is General Misbah el-Budeini. His headquarters is in Damascus. Its units number around 4,000 regular Palestinian troops who are

organized into three brigades and a number of battalions. The three brigades are Hittin Brigade, Qadasiya Brigade and Ayn Jalut Brigade.⁸⁵

Based upon this discussion, we must ask ourselves if the P.L.O. is the real representative of all Palestinians. One who wishes to analyze the P.L.O. policies, goals and intentions will find many different ideas, interests, ideologies and courses of action considering the short and long term.

Concerning this point of view, the P.L.O.'s leader Mr. Yassir Arafat said on June 1, 1979 to the Lebanese weekly--Al Hawdess:

It is quite clear that the Autonomy Talks will not lead to a Palestinian State and we shall never agree to Autonomy, whatever happens. We have nothing to lose in the region. Time is working for us The Israelis should remember that their state will not last more than 70 years. Today their state has already existed 32 years, 38 are left. Moreover, the pace of history has become faster today!⁸⁶

Concerning the rights of the Palestinians, most of the P.L.O.'s organizations extend to both banks of the Jordan River--the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the East Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The following statement was expressed very clearly by the leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, George Habash, in the P.L.O. organ, Shaun Falastiniya, in February 1970,

Shall we be content with saying that the central link is the Palestinian lands from which Israel will withdraw Let us not forget the East Bank of the Jordan, where seventy percent of the inhabitants belong to the Palestinian nation I suggest the following means: the establishment, at once, of a popular base in occupied Palestine, a base whose political struggle we shall dictate by violence; serious steps to form a Palestinian-Jordanian front on Jordanian soil, for the purpose of everyday effort and cumulative daily activities, whose strategic objective is the overthrow of King Hussein's regime.⁸⁷

It is not easy to bridge the gap between the P.L.O.'s organizations among themselves and between them and the Israeli position. The only document which is common to these organizations under the framework of the P.L.O. is the Palestinian National Covenant (1968). This covenant is supposed to bridge the gap between those who look to the territory of Palestine as their future state --to include the East Bank which means the Hashemite Kingdom, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip--currently Israeli territory--and the others who are satisfied with Israeli territory, as it currently exists. It is also supposed to bridge the gap between those who give priority to the struggle for the liberation of Palestine which is against Israel to others who give priority to the struggle for the liberation of the Arab Population and Arab Society which is supposed to be directed against present Arab rulers.⁸⁸

The first article of this covenant makes clear that Palestine belongs to Palestinians: "Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinian Arab people and an integral part of the great Arab homeland, and the people of Palestine is a part of the Arab Nation."⁸⁹ The second article means that Palestine is one unit which cannot be divided: "Palestine with its boundaries that existed at the time of the British Mandate is an integral regional unit."⁹⁰ (See map 4-1.) Article 18 gives legitimacy for fighting against Israel. On the other hand Israel's defensive actions are illegal. "The liberation of Palestine, from an international viewpoint, is a defensive act necessitated by the requirements of self-defense. For this reason, the people of Palestine, desiring to befriend all peoples, look to the support of the states which love freedom, justice and peace."⁹¹ Moreover, in Article 20 of the covenant, it states, "Judaism, in its character as a religion of revelation, is not a nationality with an independent existence. Likewise, the Jews are not one people with an independent personality. They are rather citizens of the states to which they belong."⁹² It should be emphasized that all articles mentioned previously reinforce the belief that there is no possibility of compromise. There is no space for two states--Israeli and Palestinian. Accordingly, a Palestinian State should exist in Palestine. The Israeli people cannot accept the

feasibility of such a neighbor because of the mistrust that has been further compounded by the public statements of P.L.O. leaders. Mr. Zuheir Muhsin, head of the Military Operation Department of the P.L.O. and member of its Executive Council, said in an interview with the Dutch daily Trouw on March 31, 1977,

It is only for political reasons that we carefully stress our Palestinian identity, for it is in the national interest of the Arabs to encourage a separate Palestinian identity to counter Zionism . . . Jordan is a State with defined borders. It cannot claim Haifa or Jaffa, whereas it has a right to Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem and Beersheva. After we have attained all our rights in the whole of Palestine, we must not postpone, even for a single moment, the reunification of Jordan and Palestine.⁹³

Mr. Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the P.L.O.'s Political Department, in an interview with Newsweek, on March 14, 1977 said, "There are two phases to our return: the first phase to the 1967 lines and the second to the 1948 lines . . . the third stage is the democratic State of Palestine. So we are fighting for these three stages."⁹⁴

Concerning the principles and ideologies as stated previously, Israel finds itself in a bad situation. Needless to say, at present, there is no chance for any agreement towards a peaceful future.

The P.L.O., in spite of being an unelected body representing the Palestinian people, succeeded in obtaining international recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians and as an umbrella organization. It is more well known than any of the other

Palestinian groups. The Palestine Liberation Organization has gotten a position of observer in every international institute or conference which will discuss any subject connected with the Palestinian problem.

From the viewpoint of its relations with the member-states of the Arab League, the P.L.O. should find the path between the two. On the one hand the P.L.O. gets its financial, material and military support from the Arab States. In normal times as in times of crisis, the P.L.O. is pushed, helped and encouraged by the support and inspiration of the Arab world. It owes its existence to Arab support. This support was established following a decision of the Council of the Arab League in January 1964.⁹⁵ On the other hand, we must keep in mind that some of the supporters have their own interests besides that of the Palestinian struggle. Some countries utilize the Palestinian cause for their own benefit, for inter-state necessities and for international relations between themselves and the world's states and among Arab States.⁹⁶

C. West Bank and Gaza Strip--The Areas.

No one can argue against the right of the West Bank and Gaza Strip native Palestinians to live in Palestine as he can about all or at least a part of those who are living out of this area. In spite of the wars and hostile activities by the sides, these inhabitants have stayed on

their land, and the ties to their homeland have become stronger and stronger. The interesting question is: why don't these Palestinians have leadership which can represent them in international institutes and among the Arab States? Maybe one can claim they have--the P.L.O.

Considering the Palestinian leadership position, one would say that the greatest tragedy of this people is that their leaders have never tried to talk to Israel. By saying no and refusing any movement towards compromise, nothing can be solved. From time to time there were Palestinian leaders from the Gaza Strip, Judaea and Samaria who had expressed their readiness to negotiate towards a solution and agreement, but these men were threatened and forced by extreme elements to leave political life or they were simply assassinated. The following statement was made by Mr. Nihad Jarallah, the president of the Hebron District Court, " . . . I have received them by the score, anonymous letters, threatening me for cooperating with Israeli authorities."⁹⁷ In spite of these threats, there still are many local and moderate Palestinian leaders who handle the affairs of the people and manage the daily life in contrast to the PLO's policy.⁹⁸

The P.L.O.'s ideology generally is based on an uncompromising policy of an armed struggle and on efforts to disrupt the normal life in the administered area under

military government. It must be borne in mind that a military administration, after all, cannot be compared to a normal regime. Such a situation--of administration during a period of military government in accordance with the law of armed conflict--is therefore to be distinguished from the situation in a peaceful atmosphere. However, the laws of armed conflict and international law place restrictions upon the administrators. Since June 1967, the "Open Bridges" policy has been in force. This policy allows the movement of Palestinians and goods between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Arab countries.⁹⁹ The inhabitants travel overseas freely through Israel's airports and harbors.


The basic right to life, liberty and security of person are guaranteed by the application of the principles of the rule of law which guides the activities of the administration. This rule of law itself is based upon the English system of common law. Inhabitants of the area also have the right to petition to the Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as a High Court of Justice.

Tens of thousands of Arabs have joined their families in The Areas since 1967. Coming to the point of population exchange and refugees, Figure 4-3 shows generally the relationship between the Arab and Israeli refugees.

POPULATION EXCHANGE


(REFUGEES)

JEWISH REFUGEES
FROM ARAB STATES
TO ISRAEL- 616000
TO US+EUROPE-222000



PALESTINIAN REFUGEES
FROM ISRAEL TO ARAB
STATES AND WEST BANK
AND GAZA STRIP

650000





BASED ON: U.N. DOCUMENT S/8124 18 AUGUST 1967

* now under
Israeli control

FIGURE 4-3

SOURCE: THE YOUTH INSTITUTE FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

From the viewpoint of Israel, despite the situation of military government following a period of armed conflict, and despite the continued occurrence of acts of sabotage and terrorism, both in The Areas and in Israel, every effort is made by the Israeli authorities to guide the administration along the lines of a situation of peace. On the other hand, most of the Palestinians in the administered areas, because of their everyday contacts with Israelis since 1967 and their experience as a result of the wars, have come to the conclusion that the only way to advance towards peace or any kind of quiet in this region is by way of negotiation.¹⁰⁰ If only the other Palestinians and some of the Arab States would replace the armed struggle with negotiation and follow the Egyptian lead, then these problems that divide the Arabs and Israel could be worked out.



MAP 4-1

SOURCE: ISRAEL INFORMATION CENTER, JERUSALEM.

CHAPTER 5

ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN PEACE TREATY.

As mentioned in Chapter Two, following the ceasefire in October 1973, other agreements have been signed between Egypt and Israel.

On January 18, 1974, a separation of forces agreement was signed (see Chapter 2, Map 2-7). This was followed by another separation of forces agreement on September 1, 1975 (see Chapter 2, Map 2-8). Considering this agreement the Israeli Defense Force accomplished a withdrawal from 6,180 square kilometers on February 2, 1976. The Israeli government and the government of the Arab Republic of Egypt agreed that the conflict between them and in the Middle East will be resolved by peaceful means and not by any kind of military action. They also decided that the United Nations Emergency Force will continue its function because it is essential; however, the most important part of this agreement is the following: "They (Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel) are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this Agreement being a significant step towards that end."¹⁰¹ This time, contrary to other times, the process continued in the right direction. The parties established a Joint Commission for

continuing the peace process. Both parties crossed many obstacles and overcame a lot of difficulties on the way to peace which finally came.

A. Courses Before the Peace Treaty.

The way in which President Sadat chose the historic initiative by visiting Jersusalem, and the reception accorded to him by the Israeli people have created a unique opportunity for peace which must not be lost if we want to prevent the tragedy of wars in future generations.

The phase before the Peace Treaty was signed may be divided into two parts: the time up until Camp David I Conference and from then to Camp David III Conference after which the Peace Treaty was signed.

1) Until Camp David I Conference.

Throughout this time, a few interesting meetings and events, which are worth remembering, took place in the region:

a. In November, 1977, Mohammed Anwar El-Sadat, the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, overcame years of doubts and hate, years of bitterness and bloodshed and visited Jerusalem. While there, he talked to the Israeli Parliament and many Israeli leaders. He made clear that a withdrawal of Israeli Defense Forces over the lines of June 4, 1967 would be a necessary condition for opening the road to peace. He also demanded a respect for Palestinian rights. In return, Sadat promised that the Egyptian army would not pass the Gidi and Mitla Passes--in

Sinai.¹⁰² This visit indicated a complete reverse, from wars and hostility, towards understanding, negotiation and finally peace. President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin also decided to continue the negotiation by committees and working groups.

b. On December 14, 1977, Prime Minister Begin went to Washington and offered his peace plan to President Carter.

c. On December 14, 1977, representatives of the parties met with a group of experts in conference in Cairo, but nothing came out of this meeting.

d. On December 25, 1977, Sadat and Begin met in Ismailia. The latter offered his peace plan to Sadat who rejected it, but the leaders decided to continue the negotiation by a military conference which would meet in Cairo and a political conference which would meet in Jerusalem.

e. On December 30, 1977, the Israeli Defense Minister, Ezer Weizman flew to Cairo, but his visit did not bring any positive results.

f. On January 11, 1978, a military conference at the Defense Ministers level met in Cairo. On January 17, 1978, the political conference met in Jerusalem at the level of Foreign Ministers. There had been progress in negotiation during both conferences and a very optimistic atmosphere prevailed. Suddenly, a day after opening the political conference talks on January 18, Sadat recalled

his Foreign Minister from Jerusalem to Cairo. The formal explanation was that Egypt could not make any compromises on the Palestinian issue or the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas. Therefore, the Israeli Military Conference was also recalled from Cairo to Jerusalem on February 2, 1978. A group of Israeli military representatives remained in Cairo until July 27, 1978 when they also returned to Israel.

g. On February 3, 1978, Sadat met President Carter in Camp David and they decided again not only to continue the course of negotiations but to increase the efforts towards a peace treaty.¹⁰³

h. Between February and August 1978, several meetings* took place among the leaders of both parties but nothing came of them. Instead of progress, there was a slowness and even a certain withdrawal in the relations between Egypt and Israel. Each side attacked and blamed the other through newspapers, interviews and other communication channels.¹⁰⁴

*1. In February, 1978, there was a meeting between President Sadat and Mr. Shimon Peres--Labor Party leader.

2. In March, 1978, the Israeli Defense Minister, Mr. Wiesel, visited Cairo.

3. On July 7, 1978, President Sadat and Mr. Shimon Peres met again in Austria.

4. On July 13, 1978, the Israeli Defense Minister Wiesel met President Sadat and Gali Gamasi in Zeltzburg.

5. On July 18, 1978, the foreign ministers of Israel and Egypt met in London, England.

i. On August 2, 1978, the U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, visited the Middle East and succeeded in getting the agreement of both leaders to participate in the Camp David Conference in September 1978, which resulted in:

(1) The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel, and

(2) The Framework of Peace in the Middle East. These agreements were both signed in the White House on September 17, 1978.

In the Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, the parties agreed to negotiate in good faith with a goal of creating a Peace Treaty within three months. This negotiation was based on the principles of United Nations Resolution 242.¹⁰⁵ Egypt and Israel agreed that Israel would withdraw from the Sinai peninsula and Egypt would permit the free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.¹⁰⁶ All nations would be free to navigate and fly throughout and over the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Akaba-Eilat without any harassment.¹⁰⁷ The parties also agreed on the limitation of military forces and other security arrangements, such as the quality and quantity of the forces, use of the airfields, and the location of United Nations forces.¹⁰⁸

It was also agreed that:

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal (to east of a line extending from east of El-Arish to Ras Mohammed) is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel including: full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.¹⁰⁹

The other document which was signed at the Camp David I Conference* is the Framework of Peace in the Middle East. This Framework is, as a matter of fact, an invitation for the other parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict to join the negotiation for achieving peace among Middle East people. It also encouraged good neighborly relations based on, "Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats of acts of force."¹¹⁰ In this document also, the basis for negotiation or any agreement is the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and 338. As far as the Egyptian, Israeli and American leaders' opinion is concerned, this Framework of Peace is supposed to be used as a basis for peace agreement between Israel and each of her other neighbors, but this Framework has not been accepted until now by any other Arab countries.

*For the purposes of this discussion, Camp David I occurred in September 1978 and Camp David II in February 1979.

Considering the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and in order to provide full autonomy to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the parties agreed in the Camp David accords to a transitional period of 5 years during which the parties would look for a solution to ensure the autonomy and the legitimate right of the Palestinian people.

The Jordanian Government was invited to join the negotiation with Egypt, Israel and Palestinian representatives.¹¹¹

The final status of the areas would be determined in three to five years--a transitional period. Until then, the inhabitants will elect self-governing authorities in order to replace the Israeli military government.

The Israeli forces will withdraw and redeploy into specified security locations. Local police, joint patrols and control units of the parties will be established to ensure the security of the boundaries.

The five years of a transitional period will begin from the time of the founding of a self-governing authority--administrative council. By three years of this period, two separate committees will be established in order to bridge the gap which exists among the parties. The one, consisting of representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians, "will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee,

consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement, reached on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza."¹¹²

Until reaching a lasting solution during the five years time frame, a committee which consists of representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and of a self-governing authority of the Palestinians will operate as a continuing committee to deal with matters of common interest.

The limitation of this framework is that it is written generally and can be understood by each party in a different way. Another fact which should be mentioned is that neither the Palestinians nor the Arab States accepted this plan and the invitation to join the negotiation under the limitations of this framework.

2) From Camp David I Conference to Signing the Peace Treaty.

As mentioned previously, in the Camp David I Conference, the parties set a goal to accomplish the negotiation and to sign the Peace Treaty within three months of the Camp David date. However, the Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel was not precise enough on all the disputed points. As expressed at that time, there was only a small percentage of the

disputed areas which remained 'open'. This small percentage was about basic principles, such as, the date by which autonomy would be established, and the relationship between the Israeli Egyptian Peace Treaty to other agreements--particularly those which are between Egypt and other Arab-States.¹¹³

All the efforts to overcome these disputed points which stood as obstacles on the way to a Peace Treaty failed throughout those six months. However, the following meetings and events did take place throughout this period:

- a. Blair House talks in October 1978.
- b. U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance's visit to the Middle East in December 1978.
- c. The meeting between the Israeli Foreign Minister and the Egyptian Prime Minister in Brussels on December 23, 1978.
- d. Assistant Secretary of State Alfred Atherton's visit in the Middle East in January 1979.
- e. The Camp David II Conference between February 22-25, 1979, with the participation of the Israeli Foreign Minister and the Egyptian Prime Minister.¹¹⁴ Nothing came from all these meetings. The parties were full of doubts and each side tried to gain as much as possible.

The U.S. President, Mr. Jimmy Carter, decided to visit Israel and Egypt on March 8, 1979, which helped to

lessen the freeze which was delaying the peace negotiations. Thus, after six months of talk, doubts, disappointments and hopes, President Carter succeeded in bridging the gap between the parties and the Peace Treaty between Israel and the biggest and strongest Arab State--Egypt--was signed on March 26, 1979, in Washington.¹¹⁵

(Complete text of the Treaty is at Appendix C.)

B. The Peace Treaty.

The previous analysis has shown that the way toward peace is much longer than the way toward war. The peace process is a very complex one. The passage from hate and bloodshed to normal relations and friendship between nations is difficult both physically and psychologically. Concerning this point, President Anwar El-Sadat in his interview in the Egyptian October Weekly in February 1980 said, "I know very well that friendship does not come as a result of decision as love does not come by declaring intentions . . . It is not easy to put an end to the feelings of hate, bitterness, revenge and hesitation."¹¹⁶

The President also added,

Creating normal relations between the administrations of both states was not hard, but it is very difficult to create friendship between every Israeli and every Egyptian I can understand the crying of the Israeli women-soldiers when they saw the Israeli flag come down in Sinai, as I can understand the crying of Palestinian women when they saw the Israeli flag go up in Cairo.¹¹⁷

Creating normal relations and peace between nations includes many components and actions. The most important of

those expressed in Article III of the Peace Treaty which was signed on March 26, 1979, President Anwar El-Sadat and Prime Minister Menachem Begin and was witnessed by President Jimmy Carter are:

1) "The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:

a. They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

b. They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries."¹¹⁸ Incredibly, these statements were made for the first time, not as a hope for the future or expression of intentions, but as a written fact in the Peace Treaty.

2) Egypt and Israel agreed that normal relations will include, in addition to full recognition,

a. Diplomatic relations. "The parties agree to establish diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange ambassadors upon completion of the interim withdrawal."¹¹⁹

b. Transportation and communication relations.¹²⁰

c. Economic and trade relations. "The Parties agree to remove all discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations and to terminate economic boycotts of each other."¹²¹

d. Cultural relations. "The Parties agree to establish normal cultural relations following completion of the interim withdrawal."¹²²

e. Free movement of people and goods. " . . . each Party will permit the free movement of the nationals and vehicles of the other into and within its territory . . . "¹²³

f. Human rights. "The Parties affirm their commitment to respect and observe human rights and fundamental freedoms for all . . . "¹²⁴

3) It was also agreed, "Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory . . . against the population, citizens or property of the other Party."¹²⁵

As mentioned previously, President Sadat said the written agreement and arrangement of the relations between the administrations are the easy parts. Much more difficult is the creation of understanding, tolerance and cooperation between the populations.

Because of Egypt's relations with the rest of the Arab World and her obligations and agreements with some of the Arab States, there is no priority given to this treaty over any other by Egypt. It was only agreed, "The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty."¹²⁶

There is no doubt that the Peace Treaty, as was written, was the final goal of the negotiation. This purpose was achieved concerning Egypt and Israel. My feeling is that the most asked question within both nations is: "Can written papers bridge over the gap of thirty long years of war?" This shows the anxiety within the hearts of the populations.

Considering the withdrawal and security arrangements, it was agreed that Israel would complete withdrawal from the Sinai in three years from the signing date, in two phases:

- 1) By nine months, to a line from east of El-Arish in the North to Ras-Muhammed in the South (see Map C-2).

- 2) By three years to a line of the international boundary of 1967 (see Map C-4).¹²⁷

According to the Peace Treaty documents the Sinai Peninsula was divided into zones and it was agreed upon as to which kinds of forces and in what quality and quantity could stay in each zone (see map C-1).

- 1) Zone A, between the Suez Canal to line A, will include, "An Egyptian armed force of one mechanized infantry division and its military installation and field fortifications . . ."¹²⁸

- 2) Zone B, between line A to line B, will include, "Egyptian border units of four battalions consisting of up to a total of four thousand personnel."¹²⁹
In Zone B there will also be military installations and field fortifications for these forces.

3) Zone C, between line B to line C, including Tiran and Sanafir Islands, will include "only United Nations forces and Egyptian civil police to perform normal police functions within this zone."¹³⁰

4) Zone F, between line C to line D, "In this zone there will be an Israeli limited force of four infantry battalions, their military installations, and field fortifications, and United Nations observers Israeli infantry battalions will consist of up to 180 armored personnel vehicles of all types and up to a total of four thousand personnel."¹³¹

The parties also agreed that each of them may establish early warning systems in the closest zone to their boundary, i.e., Zones A and D.¹³²

For coordinating the movements of forces, for supervising the schedules during the phases of the Israeli withdrawal, and in order to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty, the Joint Commission was formed. (For more details about the schedules of withdrawal, see Map C-3).

To sum up this part, the dream has become a reality. Egypt agreed to turn from war to peace and Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula. By gaining peace and security along its southern sector, Israel lost an area of sixty thousand square kilometers, three times the size of the State of Israel's area within the boundaries of 1967. Israel also lost the following strategic advantages:

1) Strategic depth of 250-400 kilometers of a security area. The Israeli population is no longer out of the ranges of FROG and SCUD rockets.

2) Early warning bases which were located on the high Sinai Mountains, such as, in the front line: Um-Muragem, Um-Chashiba, Mt. Racha, in the interim line: Mt. Maghara, Mt. Yaalak, and in the rear line Mt. Halal, Mt. Kharim. Also, the mountains of the southern part of the Sinai enable good electronic warning. Under the new conditions, almost all the Israeli area will be covered by electronic observation.

3) The defense from the view point of Israel was much easier from the Gidi and Mitla Passes and other key points in Sinai rather than from the new lines.

4) Loss of Sharm el-Sheikh as a strategic position to keep free the Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Eilat and Akaba.

5) The reserves in Sinai.

6) Losing eight airfields, some of them ready for use by aircraft.

All this is a cheap price for real peace, peace between nations, not only between leaders, for contentment and cooperation. But if war will again break out between Egypt and Israel, the future will teach us that Israel paid a very expensive price for an unreal peace.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

In summarizing and making conclusions and recommendations, it is necessary to review the factors which caused the dispute between the Arab States and Israel which have been considered throughout this thesis. These factors should be examined to determine which of them has changed and which has not. The conclusions should be based on cool analysis, on seeing facts and reality, not on emotion and hope. There are many factors connected to this conflict. It is impossible to analyze each of them; therefore, only the major factors will be examined.

A. Lessons Learned From the Period Under Discussion.

1) The recent events have demonstrated that agreements cannot endure when the real intentions of leaders run contrary to the agreements. Temporary agreements may serve purposes other than to promote peace between the nations. A long time ago the German statesman, Otto von Bismark, observed that words were often created to hide real intentions.

In most of the agreements between Arab States and Israel after wars, it was agreed by all parties that their purpose was to make efforts to advance from a cease fire

agreement to permanent peace. Instead of advancing toward a permanent peace there was withdrawal in the relations between states and continuation of the cycle of wars. Instead of investing in economic objectives for the betterment and prosperity of the people, the budgets were spent on weapons and other military equipment.

The lesson is that any agreement can be considered as a component of security only if it has been embraced in the hearts of the population of both sides, regardless of what is written on paper.

2) All parties, Israel and the Arab States, paid a very expensive price in terms of manpower and equipment in each war. Still the lesson that wars lead nowhere was not learned.

3) After each war the relations between Israel and the Arab States escalated to hostility. The pace of the arms race became stronger because each side tried to maintain superiority in what it saw to be the balance of power. Because of suspicions, each State believed that it would be attacked by the other side if the balance shifted unfavorably. The results of the arms race were that the region was filled with modern, high quality weapons and other destructive equipment.

4) Another lesson is that the Palestinians cannot fight and manage the struggle against Israel alone. Their problems cannot be solved before the conflict between

Israel and the Arab States is resolved. There are others who charge that the resolution to the dispute between Israel and the Arab States cannot be found before solving the Palestinian problem.

5) Israel has never become smaller because of these wars. She has withdrawn and paid in terms of area as a result of agreements or pressure by the United Nations or the Super Powers.¹³³ The Arab States were the ones who lost territory and suffered most. The Palestinians and refugees suffered, of course, too. Still the course of action was not changed from the way of war to the way of negotiation and peace.

6) It has to be said that both sides do not see a real possibility of constituting a new state in this area. Any independent Palestinian state in this area could be a real danger to the existence of both Israel and Jordan,¹³⁴ (See also Map 2-3)¹³⁵ and would create a new base in the Middle East for which the Soviet Union is looking.¹³⁶

B. Rights to the Land of Palestine

There is no change in the approach of either side concerning its rights to Palestine. The gap between the sides is great, and there does not seem to be a solution which can bridge this gap. The Palestinian problem still exists; furthermore, it is a much more difficult problem than outside observers originally imagined. As mentioned

in chapter 4, there is no general agreement as to who legitimately represents the Palestinians since the authority to represent them has not been granted based on free elections by the Palestinian people.

Generally we can find two concepts considering the rights of the Palestinians:

1) The one of the Arabs (except Egypt), which holds that the Palestinians must receive their rights, even at the cost of Israel's independence and existence.

2) The second concept is that of non-Arabs, which contends that a solution of the Palestinian problem must also include an independent Israel. The first concept says clearly that Palestinian rights must come at the cost of the State of Israel. The second concept recommends finding a good solution for both sides, but does not say how.

Another consideration is expressed by Richard Hudson who said,

The Israelis will never be able to convince the Palestinians that they should live in an autonomy under Israeli sovereignty, with Palestinians having rights only as individuals, without rights over land and water, and without the rights of Palestinian flag and passport. The Arabs will never be able to drive the Israelis into the sea. But the Israelis and the Palestinians might find a way to lasting peace on the basis of a two-state arrangement, although it would not be easy.¹³⁷

C. Balance of Power

Even under a Peace Treaty with Egypt, Israel will face, from the Eastern Front, a force which is equal to

the total force of NATO in Europe.¹³⁸ These forces are equipped with the latest weapon systems. Month by month, more and more aircraft, tanks and other systems are arriving in this region.¹³⁹

From a certain viewpoint the guarantees offered by the United Nations are considered as a security component. But in this case, because of the ability of the Arab States and their oil to influence decisions on the international stage, Israel does not trust these guarantees. Previous experience also makes her distrustful of such guarantees. This condition brings Israel to the conclusion that it must have strategic depth, according to the terms of the State of Israel, and it must have defensible boundaries.

D. Israel's Demand for Defensible Boundaries

Defensible boundaries are a function of a number of components, such as the terrain, strategic depth, and weapon systems density in the conflict area.

It was explained that the Israeli terrain consists of a crest of mountains in the center from north to south, and slopes to the Jordan Valley on the east side and to the coastal plain on the west side. Therefore, the force which controls the crest of mountains in the center will control both sides to the west and to the east. This crest of the mountains runs from north to south along the West Bank through Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, the eastern part of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Hebron.

Considering the new weapon systems such as aircraft, rockets, artillery, tanks and others, the strategic depth of this area has become smaller and smaller. Therefore, Israel's need for defensible boundaries cannot be realized within the 1949-1967 armistice lines.

E. The Arab States' Approach

No other Arab country, except Egypt, has changed her approach from the way of armed struggle to the way of negotiation and peace. No other nation confronting Israel has accepted the invitation of President Carter, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin and offered to enter into negotiation with Israel. More than that, Syria, Iraq and Jordan with the support of other Arab States have become more extreme.

President Sadat who expected and hoped for more support from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and at that time from Iran, was surprised because of the recent developments, such as, the fall of the Iranian Shah, the "rise of fundamentalist Islam," and the positions of Saudi-Arabia and Jordan vis-a-vis Camp David and Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. But in spite of all these difficulties, the Israeli leaders and people regard with seriousness the way to peace and negotiation which was opened by Egypt, the most populous and strongest (military) Arab State.

Both sides face difficulties which stand as an obstacle on the way to normal relationships between the nations.

Israel who gave back the Sinai, as a cost of peace with Egypt, an area which is three times bigger than the area within her boundaries of 1967, will be more careful about giving up territory in the other sectors before the peace with Egypt has withstood the test of time.

F. Oil as a Factor

As long as the oil-dependence of European countries, far eastern countries and the United States is so great, the oil weapon will continue to be used by the Arabs as a political means of influencing the dependent states to support the Palestinian position. As mentioned previously, we should remember the Soviet Union's desire for the Middle East oil reserves. From her viewpoint, Israel considers this fact and has become more reliant on other defense components. The international guarantees are not a viable security component as evidenced by the Six-Day war, 1967, and the Yom Kippur War, 1973.

G. The Two SuperPowers and Other States

As explained in chapter three, the Soviet Union's interest in the Middle East region is different from that of the United States. It is not interested in peace and quiet, but rather wants a situation of high tension. It wishes to promote dependence of the Arab States on its international and military support. These interests are now more pronounced than ever, because of the American success in turning Egypt from Russia to the West and in

creating the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. Concerning this point Major General Frank J. Schober, the Adjutant General State of California said, "It's (the Soviet Union's) long-term objectives must be assumed to be that of fostering Communist governments in the area and then incorporating them into the Soviet sphere of influence."¹⁴⁰

From the viewpoint of Israel, the heart of her dilemma is the vast shadow of the Soviet Union in the Middle East area.

The U.S. on the other hand, makes efforts to bridge the gap between Israel and her neighbors, to bring quiet to this severely troubled area. It has to be mentioned that the U.S. was involved in every past agreement and in every effort to avoid war. The U.S. is the only super-power which can talk to both sides, Israel and the Arab States.

The Soviet Union cannot be a mediator because of her lack of objectivity and her refusal to have diplomatic relations with Israel or to talk to her without prior conditions. Therefore, there is unique importance to U.S. influence on the events which transpire in the Middle East. Because of this unique importance, the U.S. should remain objective.

The situation of Israel with regard to other international states has become more difficult. Because of the

influence of Arab oil producing countries, Israel's feeling is that the decisions in the United Nations have been going against her. The number of representatives of Moslem States in United Nations institutions and the support of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as the recent consistent support of most of the oil-dependent European countries for the Arabs makes Israel more and more doubtful about the objectivity of international institutions.

Analysis of the key points in the Middle East dispute brings us to the unfortunate conclusion that, almost certainly, war is likely to break out again in the next few years in this region. War can break out because most of the reasons for the dispute still exist.

As a citizen of this troubled area, a soldier who is intimately familiar with the meaning of wars, and a member of a family, I and most citizens of this region hope and long for peace. In spite of this, it still seems that war is still unavoidable. We dream of a time in which our children will live in good neighborly relations and in peace and contentment and will enjoy the fruits of our suffering. When we dream, we also feel so close to the fears of war, the bloodshed, and the loss of property and life. Instead of normal relations, understanding and cooperation between our nations there seems to follow an escalation of hostility and once again, tragedy.

From all this comes a recommendation which is directed to the U.S. as a superpower which can influence courses of action concerning this region. It is strongly recommended that the U.S. keep trying and making efforts to secure a lasting peace through the new avenues which the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty has opened. There is always hope, in fact the thing which was almost unbelievable since the beginning of Arab-Israeli disputes, has occurred--peace between Israel and Egypt.

The Egyptian-Israeli treaties laid the foundation for additional negotiations and true peace between Israel and other Arab States, for economic, scientific, cultural exchanges and social betterment.

It is necessary to block the Soviet advance toward the Middle East. Then the world must understand and clarify for the Arab States and for the Palestinians that two States cannot be established within the present territory of Israel. The U.S. should continue its efforts to persuade the Arab States to recognize the right of Israel to exist and to negotiate with Israel to find a solution. My belief is that this kind of clarification will encourage the other Arab States, or perhaps a few of them, to join the peace circle which will bring some quiet and contentment to this region that needs them such as one needs air for breath.

APPENDIX A

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242*

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in

the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

*Adopted unanimously on Nov. 22, 1967.

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338*

The Security Council

1. *Calls upon* all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

*Adopted on Oct. 22, 1973, by a vote of 14 to 0 (P.R.C. did not participate in the voting).

APPENDIX B

TEXTS OF DOCUMENTS, SIGNED SEPT. 17

A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AGREED AT CAMP DAVID

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

- The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.^a

- After four wars during thirty years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.

- The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the Parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

- The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.

- To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.

- Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security.

- Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that, for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework as appropriate is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

A. West Bank and Gaza

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

- (a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, the Government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

- (b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to

be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

- (c) When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel

and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

- 1) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.

- 2) Submitting their agreement to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

- 3) Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.

- 4) Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel

and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.

3. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

B. Egypt-Israel

1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of this Framework a peace

treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

C. Associated Principles

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors—Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

(a) full recognition;

(b) abolishing economic boycotts;

(c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

4. Claims Commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect for their provisions. They shall also be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this Framework.

For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt:

A. SADAT

For the Government
of Israel:

M. BEGIN

Witnessed by:

JIMMY CARTER, President
of the United States of America

FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them.

It is agreed that:

The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.

All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.

Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

- (a) the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;
- (b) the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;
- (c) the use of airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, Rafah, Ras en Naqb, and Sharm el Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations;
- (d) the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;
- (e) the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Elat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and
- (f) the stationing of military forces listed below.

Stationing of Forces

A. No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 kilometers (km) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

B. Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km to 40 km.

C. In the area within 3 km east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.

D. Border patrol units, not to exceed three battalions, will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed: (a) in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and (b) in the Sharm el Sheikh area to ensure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including: full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

Interim Withdrawal

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:

A. SADAT

For the Government of Israel:

M. BEGIN

Witnessed by:

JIMMY CARTER, President
of the United States of America

APPENDIX C

The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty

TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the State of Israel:

PREAMBLE

Convinced of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;

Reaffirming their adherence to the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David," dated September 17, 1978;

Noting that the aforementioned Framework as appropriate is intended to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and each of its other Arab neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with it on this basis;

Desiring to bring to an end the state of war between them and to establish a peace in which every state in the area can live in security;

Convinced that the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel is an important step in the search for comprehensive peace in the area and for the attainment of the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects;

Inviting the other Arab parties to this dispute to join the peace process with Israel guided by and based on the principles of the aforementioned Framework;

Desiring as well to develop friendly relations and cooperation between themselves in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law governing international relations in times of peace;

Agree to the following provisions in the free exercise of their sovereignty, in order to implement the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel":

ARTICLE I

1. The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

2. Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex I), and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai.

3. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in Annex I, the Parties will establish normal and friendly relations, in accordance with Article III (3).

ARTICLE II

The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip. The Parties recognize this boundary as inviolable. Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace.

ARTICLE III

1. The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the

principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:

- a. They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
- b. They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries;
- c. They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.

2. Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice.

3. The Parties agree that the normal relationship established between them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual enjoyment by citizens of the due process of law. The process by which they undertake to achieve such a relationship parallel to the implementation of other provisions of this Treaty is set out in the annexed protocol (Annex III).

ARTICLE IV

1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and observers, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex I, and other security arrangements the Parties may agree upon.

2. The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex I. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is

approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise agree.

3. A Joint Commission will be established to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex I.

4. The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

ARTICLE V

1. Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall enjoy the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, applying to all nations. Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes, as well as persons, vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall be accorded non-discriminatory treatment in all matters connected with usage of the canal.

2. The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

ARTICLE VI

1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.

3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositaries of such conventions.

4. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty.

5. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

ARTICLE VII

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.

2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.

ARTICLE VIII

The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty supersedes the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of September, 1975.

3. All protocols, annexes, and maps attached to this Treaty shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

4. The Treaty shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

[Facsimile of signature page of Treaty as executed]

DONE at Washington, D.C. this 26th day of March, 1979, in triplicate in the English, Arabic, and Hebrew languages, each text being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.


حررت في واشنطن دي . سي . في ٢٦ مارس ١٩٧٩ م ، ٢٧ ربيع الاول ١٣٩٩ هـ
من ثلاث نسخ باللغات الانجليزية والعربية والعبرية وتعتبر جميعها متساوية
الحجية ، وفي حالة الخلاف حول التفسير فيكون النص الانجليزي هو الذي يعتد به .

נעשה בוועינגטון , די.סי. ביום זה כ"ז באדר לשנת תשל"ט, 26 במרץ 1979, בשלושה
עותקים בשפות האנגלית, הערבית והעברית וכל נוסח אמין במידה שווה. במקרה של הבדלי
פרשנות, יכריע הנוסח האנגלי .

For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt:

عن حكومة
جمهورية مصر العربية :


בשם ממשלת הרפובליקה הערבית
של מצרים :




For the Government
of Israel:

عن حكومة
اسرائيل :

בשם ממשלת ישראל :



Witnessed by:
شهد التوقيع :
הועד על-ידי :



Jimmy Carter, President
of the United States of America

جيمس كارتر ، رئيس
الولايات المتحدة الامريكية

ג'ימי קארטר , נשיא
ארצות הברית של אמריקה

ANNEX I

PROTOCOL CONCERNING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Article I Concept of Withdrawal

1. Israel will complete withdrawal of all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai not later than three years from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

2. To ensure the mutual security of the Parties, the implementation of phased withdrawal will be accompanied by the military measures and establishment of zones set out in this Annex and in Map I, hereinafter referred to as "the Zones."

3. The withdrawal from the Sinai will be accomplished in two phases:

a. The interim withdrawal behind the line from east of El Arish to Ras Muhammed as delineated on Map 2 within nine months from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

b. The final withdrawal from the Sinai behind the international boundary not later than three years from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

4. A Joint Commission will be formed immediately after the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty in order to supervise and coordinate movements and schedules during the withdrawal, and to adjust plans and timetables as necessary within the limits established by paragraph 3, above. Details relating to the Joint Commission are set out in Article IV of the attached Appendix. The Joint Commission will be dissolved upon completion of final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

Article II Determination of Final Lines and Zones

1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties after the final withdrawal, the lines and the Zones delineated on Map I are to be established and organized as follows:

a. Zone A

(1) Zone A is bounded on the east by line A (red line) and on the west by the Suez Canal and the east coast of the Gulf of Suez, as shown on Map I.

(2) An Egyptian armed force of one mechanized infantry division and its military installations, and field fortifications, will be in this Zone.

(3) The main elements of that Division will consist of:

- (a) Three mechanized infantry brigades.
- (b) One armored brigade.
- (c) Seven field artillery battalions including up to 126 artillery pieces.
- (d) Seven anti-aircraft artillery battalions including individual surface-to-air missiles and up to 126 anti-aircraft guns of 37 mm and above.
- (e) Up to 230 tanks.
- (f) Up to 480 armored personnel vehicles of all types.
- (g) Up to a total of twenty-two thousand personnel.

b. Zone B

(1) Zone B is bounded by line B (green-line) on the east and by line A (red line) on the west, as shown on Map I.

(2) Egyptian border units of four battalions equipped with light weapons and wheeled vehicles will provide security and supplement the civil police in maintaining order in Zone B. The main elements of the four Border Battalions will consist of up to a total of four thousand personnel.

(3) Land based, short range, low power, coastal warning points of the border patrol units may be established on the coast of this Zone.

(4) There will be in Zone B field fortifications and military installations for the four border battalions.

c. Zone C

(1) Zone C is bounded by line B (green line) on the west and the International Boundary and the Gulf of Aqaba on the east, as shown on Map I.

(2) Only United Nations forces and Egyptian civil police will be stationed in Zone C.

(3) The Egyptian civil police armed with light weapons will perform normal police functions within this Zone.

(4) The United Nations Force will be deployed within Zone C and perform its functions as defined in Article VI of this Annex.

(5) The United Nations Force will be stationed mainly in camps located within the following stationing areas shown on Map I, and will establish its precise locations after consultations with Egypt:

(a) In that part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 Km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the International Boundary.

(b) In the Sharm el Sheikh area.

d. Zone D

(1) Zone D is bounded by line D (blue line) on the east and the international boundary on the west, as shown on Map I.

(2) In this Zone there will be an Israeli limited force of four infantry battalions, their military installations, and field fortifications, and United Nations observers.

(3) The Israeli forces in Zone D will not include tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft missiles except individual surface-to-air missiles.

(4) The main elements of the four Israeli infantry battalions will consist of up to 180 armored personnel vehicles of all types and up to a total of four thousand personnel.

2. Access across the international boundary shall only be permitted through entry check points designated by each Party and under its control. Such access shall be in accordance with laws and regulations of each country.

3. Only those field fortifications, military instal-

lations, forces, and weapons specifically permitted by this Annex shall be in the Zones.

Article III Aerial Military Regime

1. Flights of combat aircraft and reconnaissance flights of Egypt and Israel shall take place only over Zones A and D, respectively.

2. Only unarmed, non-combat aircraft of Egypt and Israel will be stationed in Zones A and D, respectively.

3. Only Egyptian unarmed transport aircraft will take off and land in Zone B and up to eight such aircraft may be maintained in Zone B. The Egyptian border units may be equipped with unarmed helicopters to perform their functions in Zone B.

4. The Egyptian civil police may be equipped with unarmed police helicopters to perform normal police functions in Zone C.

5. Only civilian airfields may be built in the Zones.

6. Without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, only those military aerial activities specifically permitted by this Annex shall be allowed in the Zones and the airspace above their territorial waters.

Article IV Naval Regime

1. Egypt and Israel may base and operate naval vessels along the coasts of Zones A and D, respectively.

2. Egyptian coast guard boats, lightly armed, may be stationed and operate in the territorial waters of Zone B to assist the border units in performing their functions in this Zone.

3. Egyptian civil police equipped with light boats, lightly armed, shall perform normal police functions within the territorial waters of Zone C.

4. Nothing in this Annex shall be considered as derogating from the right of innocent passage of the naval vessels of either party.

5. Only civilian maritime ports and installations may be built in the Zones.

6. Without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, only those naval activities specifically permitted by this Annex shall be allowed in the Zones and in their territorial waters.

Article V Early Warning Systems

Egypt and Israel may establish and operate early warning systems only in Zones A and D respectively.

Article VI United Nations Operations

1. The Parties will request the United Nations to provide forces and observers to supervise the implementation of this Annex and employ their best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.

2. With respect to these United Nations forces and observers, as appropriate, the Parties agree to request the following arrangements:

a. Operation of check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts along the international boundary and line B, and within Zone C.

b. Periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions of this Annex will be carried out not less than twice a month unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.

c. Additional verifications within 48 hours after the receipt of a request from either Party.

d. Ensuring the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran in accordance with Article V of the Treaty of Peace.

3. The arrangements described in this article for each zone will be implemented in Zones A, B, and C by the United Nations Force and in Zone D by the United Nations Observers.

4. United Nations verification teams shall be accompanied by liaison officers of the respective Party.

5. The United Nations Force and observers will report their findings to both Parties.

6. The United Nations Force and Observers operating in the Zones will enjoy freedom of movement and other facilities necessary for the performance of their tasks.

7. The United Nations Force and Observers are not empowered to authorize the crossing of the international boundary.

8. The Parties shall agree on the nations from which the United Nations Force and Observers will be drawn. They will be drawn from nations other than those which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

9. The Parties agree that the United Nations should make those command arrangements that will best assure the effective implementation of its responsibilities.

Article VII Liaison System

1. Upon dissolution of the Joint Commission, a liaison system between the Parties will be established. This liaison system is intended to provide an effective method to assess progress in the implementation of obligations under the present Annex and to resolve any problem that may arise in the course of implementation, and refer other unresolved matters to the higher military authorities of the two countries respectively for consideration. It is also intended to prevent situations resulting from errors or misinterpretation on the part of either Party.

2. An Egyptian liaison office will be established in the city of El-Arish and an Israeli liaison office will be established in the city of Beer-Sheba. Each office will be headed by an officer of the respective country, and assisted by a number of officers.

3. A direct telephone link between the two offices will be set up and also direct telephone lines with the United Nations command will be maintained by both offices.

Article VIII
Respect for War Memorials

Each Party undertakes to preserve in good condition the War Memorials erected in the memory of soldiers of the other Party, namely those erected by Israel in the Sinai and those to be erected by Egypt in Israel, and shall permit access to such monuments.

Article IX
Interim Arrangements

The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and civilians behind the interim withdrawal line, and the conduct of the forces of the Parties and the United Nations prior to the final withdrawal, will be governed by the attached Appendix and Maps 2 and 3.

APPENDIX TO ANNEX I
ORGANIZATION OF MOVEMENTS IN THE SINAI

Article I
Principles of Withdrawal

1. The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and civilians from the Sinai will be accomplished in two phases as described in Article I of Annex I. The description and timing of the withdrawal are included in this Appendix. The Joint Commission will develop and present to the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations forces in the Middle East the details of these phases not later than one month before the initiation of each phase of withdrawal.

2. Both Parties agree on the following principles for the sequence of military movements.

a. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article IX, paragraph 2, of this Treaty, until Israeli armed forces complete withdrawal from the current J and M Lines established by the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of September 1975, hereinafter referred to as the 1975 Agreement, up to the interim withdrawal line, all military arrangements existing under that Agreement will remain in effect, except those military arrangements otherwise provided for in this Appendix.

b. As Israeli armed forces withdraw, United Nations forces will immediately enter the evacuated areas to establish interim and temporary buffer zones as shown on Maps 2 and 3, respectively, for the purpose of maintaining a separation of forces. United Nations forces' deployment will precede the movement of any other personnel into these areas.

c. Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have evacuated any area located in Zone A, units of Egyptian armed forces shall deploy in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix.

d. Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have evacuated any area located in Zones A or B, Egyptian border units shall deploy in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix, and will function in accordance with the provisions of Article II of Annex I.

e. Egyptian civil police will enter evacuated areas immediately after the United Nations forces to perform normal police functions.

f. Egyptian naval units shall deploy in the Gulf of Suez in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix.

g. Except those movements mentioned above, deployments of Egyptian armed forces and the activities covered in Annex I will be effected in the evacuated areas when Israeli armed forces have completed their withdrawal behind the interim withdrawal line.

Article II
Subphases of the Withdrawal to the Interim Withdrawal Line

1. The withdrawal to the interim withdrawal line will be accomplished in subphases as described in this Article and as shown on Map 3. Each subphase will be completed within the indicated number of months from the date of the ex-

change of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

a. First subphase: within two months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area of El Arish, including the town of El Arish and its airfield, shown as Area I on Map 3.

b. Second subphase: within three months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area between line M of the 1975 Agreement and line A, shown as Area II on Map 3.

c. Third subphase: within five months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the areas east and south of Area II, shown as Area III on Map 3.

d. Fourth subphase: within seven months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area of El Tor-Ras El Kenisa, shown as Area IV on Map 3.

e. Fifth subphase: Within nine months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the remaining areas west of the interim withdrawal line, including the areas of Santa Katrina and the areas east of the Giddi and Mitla passes, shown as Area V on Map 3, thereby completing Israeli withdrawal behind the interim withdrawal line.

2. Egyptian forces will deploy in the areas evacuated by Israeli armed forces as follows:

a. Up to one-third of the Egyptian armed forces in the Sinai in accordance with the 1975 Agreement will deploy in the portions of Zone A lying within Area I, until the completion of interim withdrawal. Thereafter, Egyptian armed forces as described in Article II of Annex I will be deployed in Zone A up to the limits of the interim buffer zone.

b. The Egyptian naval activity in accordance with Article IV of Annex I will commence along the coasts of Areas II, III, and IV, upon completion of the second, third, and fourth subphases, respectively.

c. Of the Egyptian border units described in Article II of Annex I, upon completion of the first subphase one battalion will be deployed in Area I. A second battalion will be deployed in Area II upon completion of the second subphase. A third battalion will be deployed in Area III upon completion of the third subphase. The second and third

battalions mentioned above may also be deployed in any of the subsequently evacuated areas of the southern Sinai.

3. United Nations forces in Buffer Zone I of the 1975 Agreement will redeploy to enable the deployment of Egyptian forces described above upon the completion of the first subphase, but will otherwise continue to function in accordance with the provisions of that Agreement in the remainder of that zone until the completion of interim withdrawal, as indicated in Article I of this Appendix.

4. Israeli convoys may use the roads south and east of the main road junction east of El Arish to evacuate Israeli forces and equipment up to the completion of interim withdrawal. These convoys will proceed in daylight upon four hours notice to the Egyptian liaison group and United Nations forces, will be escorted by United Nations forces, and will be in accordance with schedules coordinated by the Joint Commission. An Egyptian liaison officer will accompany convoys to assure uninterrupted movement. The Joint Commission may approve other arrangements for convoys.

Article III United Nations Forces

1. The Parties shall request that United Nations forces be deployed as necessary to perform the functions described in this Appendix up to the time of completion of final Israeli withdrawal. For that purpose, the Parties agree to the redeployment of the United Nations Emergency Force.

2. United Nations forces will supervise the implementation of this Appendix and will employ their best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.

3. When United Nations forces deploy in accordance with the provisions of Articles I and II of this Appendix, they will perform the functions of verification in limited force zones in accordance with Article VI of Annex I, and will establish check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts in the temporary buffer zones described in Article II above. Other functions of the United Nations forces which concern the interim buffer zone are described in Article V of this Appendix.

Article IV Joint Commission and Liaison

1. The Joint Commission referred to in Article IV of this Treaty will function from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty up to the date of completion of final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

2. The Joint Commission will be composed of representatives of each Party headed by senior officers. This Commission shall invite a representative of the United Nations when discussing subjects concerning the United Nations, or when either Party requests United Nations presence. Decisions of the Joint Commission will be reached by agreement of Egypt and Israel.

3. The Joint Commission will supervise the implementation of the arrangements described in Annex I and this Appendix. To this end, and by agreement of both Parties, it will:

- a. coordinate military movements described in this Appendix and supervise their implementation;
- b. address and seek to resolve any problem arising out of the implementation of Annex I and this Appendix, and discuss any violations reported by the United Nations Force and Observers and refer to the Governments of Egypt and Israel any unresolved problems;
- c. assist the United Nations Force and Observers in the execution of their mandates, and deal with the timetables of the periodic verifications when referred to it by the Parties as provided for in Annex I and in this Appendix;
- d. organize the demarcation of the international boundary and all lines and zones described in Annex I and this Appendix;
- e. supervise the handing over of the main installations in the Sinai from Israel to Egypt;
- f. agree on necessary arrangements for finding and returning missing bodies of Egyptian and Israeli soldiers;
- g. organize the setting up and operation of entry check points along the El Arish-Ras Muhammed line in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of Annex III;
- h. conduct its operations through the use of

joint liaison teams consisting of one Israeli representative and one Egyptian representative, provided from a standing Liaison Group, which will conduct activities as directed by the Joint Commission;

- i. provide liaison and coordination to the United Nations command implementing provisions of the Treaty, and, through the joint liaison teams, maintain local coordination and cooperation with the United Nations Force stationed in specific areas or United Nations Observers monitoring specific areas for any assistance as needed;
- j. discuss any other matters which the Parties by agreement may place before it.

4. Meetings of the Joint Commission shall be held at least once a month. In the event that either Party or the Command of the United Nations Force requests a special meeting, it will be convened within 24 hours.

5. The Joint Commission will meet in the buffer zone until the completion of the interim withdrawal and in El Arish and Beer-Sheba alternately afterwards. The first meeting will be held not later than two weeks after the entry into force of this Treaty.

Article V Definition of the Interim Buffer Zone and Its Activities

1. An interim buffer zone, by which the United Nations Force will effect a separation of Egyptian and Israeli elements, will be established west of and adjacent to the interim withdrawal line as shown on Map 2 after implementation of Israeli withdrawal and deployment behind the interim withdrawal line. Egyptian civil police equipped with light weapons will perform normal police functions within this zone.

2. The United Nations Force will operate check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts within the interim buffer zone in order to ensure compliance with the terms of this Article.

3. In accordance with arrangements agreed upon by both Parties and to be coordinated by the Joint Commission, Israeli personnel will operate

military technical installations at four specific locations shown on Map 2 and designated as T1 (map central coordinate 57163940), T2 (map central coordinate 59351541), T3 (map central coordinate 59331527), and T4 (map central coordinate 61130979) under the following principles:

a. The technical installations shall be manned by technical and administrative personnel equipped with small arms required for their protection (revolvers, rifles, sub-machine guns, light machine guns, hand grenades, and ammunition), as follows:

T1-up to 150 personnel
T2 and T3-up to 350 personnel
T4-up to 200 personnel.

b. Israeli personnel will not carry weapons outside the sites, except officers who may carry personal weapons.

c. Only a third party agreed to by Egypt and Israel will enter and conduct inspections within the perimeters of technical installations in the buffer zone. The third party will conduct inspections in a random manner at least once a month. The inspections will verify the nature of the operation of the installations and the weapons and personnel therein. The third party will immediately report to the Parties any divergence from an installation's visual and electronic surveillance or communications role.

d. Supply of the installations, visits for technical and administrative purposes, and replacement of personnel and equipment situated in the sites, may occur uninterruptedly from the United Nations check points to the perimeter of the technical installations, after checking and being escorted by only the United Nations forces.

e. Israel will be permitted to introduce into its technical installations items required for the proper functioning of the installations and personnel.

f. As determined by the Joint Commission, Israel will be permitted to:

(1) Maintain in its installations fire-fighting and general maintenance equipment as well as wheeled administrative vehicles and mobile engineering equipment necessary for the maintenance

of the sites. All vehicles shall be unarmed.

(2) Within the sites and in the buffer zone, maintain roads, water lines, and communications cables which serve the sites. At each of the three installation locations (T1, T2 and T3, and T4), this maintenance may be performed with up to two unarmed wheeled vehicles and by up to twelve unarmed personnel with only necessary equipment, including heavy engineering equipment if needed. This maintenance may be performed three times a week, except for special problems, and only after giving the United Nations four hours notice. The teams will be escorted by the United Nations.

g. Movement to and from the technical installations will take place only during daylight hours. Access to, and exit from, the technical installations shall be as follows:

(1) T1: through a United Nations check point, and via the road between Abu Aweigila and the intersection of the Abu Aweigila road and the Gebel Libni road (at Km. 161), as shown on Map 2.

(2) T2 and T3: through a United Nations checkpoint and via the road constructed across the buffer zone to Gebel Katrina, as shown on Map 2.

(3) T2, T3, and T4: via helicopters flying within a corridor at the times, and according to a flight profile, agreed to by the Joint Commission. The helicopters will be checked by the United Nations Force at landing sites outside the perimeter of the installations.

h. Israel will inform the United Nations Force at least one hour in advance of each intended movement to and from the installations.

i. Israel shall be entitled to evacuate sick and wounded and summon medical experts and medical teams at any time after giving immediate notice to the United Nations Force.

4. The details of the above principles and all other matters in this Article requiring coordination by the Parties will be handled by the Joint Commission.

5. These technical installations will be withdrawn when Israeli forces withdraw from the interim withdrawal line, or at a time agreed by the Parties.

Article VI

Disposition of Installations and Military Barriers

Disposition of installations and military barriers will be determined by the Parties in accordance with the following guidelines:

1. Up to three weeks before Israeli withdrawal from any area, the Joint Commission will arrange for Israeli and Egyptian liaison and technical teams to conduct a joint inspection of all appropriate installations to agree upon condition of structures and articles which will be transferred to Egyptian control and to arrange for such transfer. Israel will declare, at that time, its plans for disposition of installations and articles within the installations.

2. Israel undertakes to transfer to Egypt all agreed infrastructure, utilities, and installations intact, inter alia, airfields, roads, pumping stations, and ports. Israel will present to Egypt the information necessary for the maintenance and operation of these facilities. Egyptian technical teams will be permitted to observe and familiarize themselves with the operation of these facilities for a period of up to two weeks prior to transfer.

3. When Israel relinquishes Israeli military water points near El Arish and El Tor, Egyptian technical teams will assume control of those installations and ancillary equipment in accordance with an orderly transfer process arranged beforehand by the Joint Commission. Egypt undertakes to continue to make available at all water supply points the normal quantity of currently available water up to the time Israel withdraws behind the international boundary, unless otherwise agreed in the Joint Commission.

4. Israel will make its best effort to remove or destroy all military barriers, including obstacles and minefields, in the areas and adjacent waters from which it withdraws, according to the following concept:

a. Military barriers will be cleared first from areas near populations, roads, and major installations and utilities.

b. For those obstacles and minefields which cannot be removed or destroyed prior to Israeli withdrawal, Israel will provide detailed maps to Egypt and the United Nations through the Joint Commission not later than 15 days before entry of United Nations forces into the affected areas.

c. Egyptian military engineers will enter those areas after United Nations forces enter to conduct barrier clearance operations in accordance with Egyptian plans to be submitted prior to implementation.

Article VII

Surveillance Activities

1. Aerial surveillance activities during the withdrawal will be carried out as follows:

a. Both Parties request the United States to continue airborne surveillance flights in accordance with previous agreements until the completion of final Israeli withdrawal.

b. Flight profiles will cover the Limited Forces Zones to monitor the limitations on forces and armaments, and to determine that Israeli armed forces have withdrawn from the areas described in Article II of Annex I, Article II of this Appendix, and Maps 2 and 3, and that these forces thereafter remain behind their lines. Special inspection flights may be flown at the request of either Party or of the United Nations.

c. Only the main elements in the military organizations of each Party, as described in Annex I and in this Appendix, will be reported.


2. Both Parties request the United States operated Sinai Field Mission to continue its operations in accordance with previous agreements until completion of the Israeli withdrawal from the area east of the Giddi and Mitla Passes. Thereafter, the Mission will be terminated.

Article VIII

Exercise of Egyptian Sovereignty


Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over evacuated parts of the Sinai upon Israeli withdrawal as provided for in Article I of this Treaty.

MAP 1



Sinai Peninsula


MAP 2



LINES AND ZONES EFFECTIVE WHEN ISRELI FORCES ARE ON THE EL ARISH - RAS MOHAMMAD LINE.

Sinai Peninsula

MAP 3




SUB-PHASES OF WITHDRAWAL TO THE EL ARISH - RAS MOHAMMAD LINE.

- Israeli Sub-Phase Line
- Egyptian Sub-Phase Line
- U.N. Sub-Phase Buffer Zone

Sinai Peninsula

MAP 4 ANNEX II



International Boundary

ANNEX III

PROTOCOL CONCERNING RELATIONS OF THE PARTIES

Article 1 Diplomatic and Consular Relations

The Parties agree to establish diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange ambassadors upon completion of the interim withdrawal.

Article 2 Economic and Trade Relations

1. The Parties agree to remove all discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations and to terminate economic boycotts of each other upon completion of the interim withdrawal.

2. As soon as possible, and not later than six months after the completion of the interim withdrawal, the Parties will enter negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement on trade and commerce for the purpose of promoting beneficial economic relations.

Article 3 Cultural Relations

1. The Parties agree to establish normal cultural relations following completion of the interim withdrawal.

2. They agree on the desirability of cultural exchanges in all fields, and shall, as soon as possible and not later than six months after completion of the interim withdrawal, enter into negotiations with a view to concluding a cultural agreement for this purpose.

Article 4 Freedom of Movement

1. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, each Party will permit the free movement of the nationals and vehicles of the other into and within its territory according to the general rules applicable to nationals and vehicles of other states. Neither Party will impose discriminatory restrictions on the

free movement of persons and vehicles from its territory to the territory of the other.

2. Mutual unimpeded access to places of religious and historical significance will be provided on a nondiscriminatory basis.

Article 5 Cooperation for Development and Good Neighborly Relations

1. The Parties recognize a mutuality of interest in good neighborly relations and agree to consider means to promote such relations.

2. The Parties will cooperate in promoting peace, stability and development in their region. Each agrees to consider proposals the other may wish to make to this end.

3. The Parties shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and will, accordingly, abstain from hostile propaganda against each other.

Article 6 Transportation and Telecommunications

1. The Parties recognize as applicable to each other the rights, privileges and obligations provided for by the aviation agreements to which they are both party, particularly by the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944 ("The Chicago Convention") and the International Air Services Transit Agreement, 1944.

2. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal any declaration of national emergency by a party under Article 89 of the Chicago Convention will not be applied to the other party on a discriminatory basis.

3. Egypt agrees that the use of airfields left by Israel near El Arish, Rafah, Ras El Nagb and Sharm El Sheikh shall be for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations.

4. As soon as possible and not later than six months after the completion of the interim withdrawal, the Parties shall enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a civil aviation agreement.

5. The Parties will reopen and maintain roads and railways between their countries and will consider further road and rail links. The Parties further agree that a highway will be constructed and maintained between Egypt, Israel and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage of persons, vehicles and goods between Egypt and Jordan, without prejudice to their sovereignty over that part of the highway which falls within their respective territory.

6. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, normal postal, telephone, telex, data facsimile, wireless and cable communications and television relay services by cable, radio and satellite shall be established between the two Parties in accordance with all relevant international conventions and regulations.

7. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, each Party shall grant normal access to its ports for vessels and cargoes of the other, as well as vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from the other.

Such access shall be granted on the same conditions generally applicable to vessels and cargoes of other nations. Article 5 of the Treaty of Peace will be implemented upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of the aforementioned Treaty.

Article 7 Enjoyment of Human Rights

The Parties affirm their commitment to respect and observe human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and they will promote these rights and freedoms in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

Article 8 Territorial Seas

Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 5 of the Treaty of Peace each Party recognizes the right of the vessels of the other Party to innocent passage through its territorial sea in accordance with the rules of international law.

**AGREED MINUTES
TO ARTICLES I, IV, V AND VI AND ANNEXES I AND III
OF TREATY OF PEACE**

ARTICLE I

Egypt's resumption of the exercise of full sovereignty over the Sinai provided for in paragraph 2 of Article I shall occur with regard to each area upon Israel's withdrawal from that area.

ARTICLE IV

It is agreed between the parties that the review provided for in Article IV(4) will be undertaken when requested by either party, commencing within three months of such a request, but that any amendment can be made only with the mutual agreement of both parties.

ARTICLE V

The second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V shall not be construed as limiting the first sentence of that paragraph. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V, which reads as follows:

"The parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba."

ARTICLE VI(2)

The provisions of Article VI shall not be construed in contradiction to the provisions of the framework for peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI(2) of the Treaty, which reads as follows:

"The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty."

ARTICLE VI(5)

It is agreed by the Parties that there is no assertion that this Treaty prevails over other Treaties or agreements or that other Treaties or agreements prevail over this Treaty. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI(5) of the Treaty, which reads as follows:

"Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented."

ANNEX I

Article VI, Paragraph 8, of Annex I provides as follows:

"The Parties shall agree on the nations from which the United Nations force and observers will be drawn. They will be drawn from nations other than those which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council."

The Parties have agreed as follows:

"With respect to the provisions of paragraph 8, Article VI, of Annex I, if no agreement is reached between the Parties, they will accept or support a U.S. proposal concerning the composition of the United Nations force and observers."

ANNEX III

The Treaty of Peace and Annex III thereto provide for establishing normal economic relations between the Parties. In accordance therewith, it is agreed that such relations will include normal commercial sales of oil by Egypt to Israel, and that Israel shall be fully entitled to make bids for

Egyptian-origin oil not needed for Egyptian domestic oil consumption, and Egypt and its oil concessionaires will entertain bids made by Israel, on the same basis and terms as apply to other bidders for such oil.

For the Government
of Israel:
M. BEGIN

For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt:
A. SADAT

Witnessed by:

JIMMY CARTER
Jimmy Carter, President
of the United States of America

APPENDIX D

ENDNOTES

¹Department of State, Bulletin, The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy, Volume 1978, No. 2019, pp. 1-14.

²Ibid., pp. 9-10.

³Department of State, The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, Selected Documents, No. 11, Washington, April 1979, pp. 1-4.

⁴Kibbutz is Israeli name for a voluntary collective community engaging mainly in agriculture but also industry, in which there is no private wealth and which is responsible for the needs of the members and their families.

⁵Orenshtein, Y., Bible, Psalm, Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1973, Chapter 137, Paragraph 5.

⁶Gulf of Eilat-Gulf of Akaba. As an Israeli I will use the names of places and phrases which are used and known in Israel.

⁷Israel Pocket Library, History From 1880, Keter Publishing House Ltd., Jerusalem, Israel, 1973, p. 39.

⁸Ibid., p. 50.

⁹Dr. M.G. Harkavi, Y. The Palestinian National Covenant (1968), Information Center of Education Office, Jerusalem, 1974, p. 15.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 16.

¹¹Ibid., p. 19.

¹²Ibid., pp. 25, 26.

¹³David Ben-Gurion, The Right of the Jewish People to the Land of Israel, Information Center, Jerusalem, 1947, p. 56.

¹⁴Ibid., Bulletin, Volume 1978, No. 2019, p. 9.

¹⁵Mr. Arthur Goldberg, The Department of State Bulletin, The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy, Volume LVII, No. 1486, December 1967, p. 839.

16Viewpoint of the author.

17Yishuv is a Hebrew word for settlement which usually works in agriculture.

18Galilee finger--it is the northeast part of the State of Israel which looks like a finger.

19Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, The Middle East Confrontation States, New York, April 1977, pp. 125-130.

20Israeli Ministry of Defense, Monthly Report, Tel-Aviv, March-April 1978, No. 3-4.

21Ma'abarot means transit camps for immigrants in Hebrew language.

22Moshav, means cooperative village, based on principles of mutual aid and equality of opportunity.

23Abba Eban, Text of the address by Israel's Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, to the U.N. Security Council on October 30, 1956, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Division of Information Periodical, 1967.

24Aviezer Golan, Sinai Campaign, Ministry of Defense, Division of Information, Tel-Aviv 1958, pp. 3-14, 101.

25Ibid., pp. 101-105.

26For details see: Ibid, Sinai Campaign.

27Ibid., History From 1880, pp. 193-195.

28Ibid., pp. 195-200.

29Ministry of Defense, Division of Information, The Six-Day War, Tel-Aviv 1968.

30Ibid., History From 1880, pp. 194-200.

31Ibid., p. 197.

32Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Division of Information, Periodical, 1967.

33Ibid., History From 1880, p. 212.

34Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statements and Documents on the October 1973 War, 1973, p. 35.

35Personal communication from Professor John Fishel, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, LaCrosse, March 2, 1980.

³⁶Anwar El-Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography, Harper and Row, 1978.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 228-231.

³⁸Elitzur Peled, Ma'arachot, Ministry of Defense Periodical, September 1974, No. 240, p. 8.

³⁹Chunoch Bav-Tov, 48 Years and 20 More Days, Ma'ariv Publishing, Tel-Aviv, 1979, Volume 1.

⁴⁰Ibid., Statements and Documents on the October 1973 War, pp. 23-25.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 25.

⁴²Ibid., p. 24.

⁴³Knesset, is the Israeli Parliament.

⁴⁴Ibid., Statements and Documents on the October 1973 War, pp. 5-6.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 6.

⁴⁶Ibid., Bulletin, Volume 1978, No. 2019, pp. 9-10.

⁴⁷For a detailed explanation of the fighting which took place during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War see Chunach Bar-Tav, 48 Years and 20 More Days, 1979.

⁴⁸Shahram Chubin, "Soviet Policy Towards Iran and the Gulf," Adelphi Papers, No. 157, The International Institute for Strategic Studies: London, 1980, pp. 8-9.

⁴⁹Central Intelligence Agency, The World Oil Market in the Years Ahead, Document No. ER79-10327U, August 1979, pp. 37 and 40.

⁵⁰Augustus R. Norton, Moscow and the Palestinians, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami 1974, p. 25.

⁵¹The U.S. has provided economic assistance to several Arab States in the region regardless of their positions vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli dispute.

⁵²UNRWA, United Nations Refugees Welfare Assistance.

⁵³Arms can only be sold to a country after it has agreed to certain conditions laid down in the Mutual Security Act. The conditions for the sale of arms are:

That the president shall have received commitments satisfactory to him that such equipment, materials, or services are required for and will be used by such nation solely to maintain its national security, its legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part, consistent with the charter of the United Nations, and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state.

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Relations, Report of Special Study Mission to the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, 84th Congress, 2d Sess., May 10, 1956 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 39.

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APPENDIX E

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